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Abstract 
In this paper we seek to determine the effect of assets held in early adult life on 
later outcomes. We specifically look at wages, employment prospects, general 
health and Malaise. The identification of an asset-effect throws up a number of 
statistical challenges as asset holding is not random. We employ a number of 
statistical techniques in our search for the causal effect of assets on adult health 
and employment outcomes. We find that simple Ordinary Least Squares and 
probit estimates of the asset effect are indeed biased in many cases. However, 
after applying a battery of techniques to remove such biases, the conclusion is 
that within the cohort examined (born in 1958), early asset holding does have 
positive effects on later wages, employment prospects, excellent general health 
and in reducing malaise. 
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1. Introduction 
In the United Kingdom much attention has focused on growing inequalities in 
individual earnings and household income over the last 25 years. Much less 
attention has been paid to inequalities in assets and wealth. It would seem 
inevitable that inequalities in income and earnings feed through to inequalities 
in wealth; as richer individuals/families have an excess of income over 
consumption needs leading to asset accumulation; and, poorer 
individuals/families often experience periods where consumption needs exceed 
income, leading them to either draw down on assets or go into debt. In this 
way, inequalities in flows (income and earnings) manifest into inequalities in 
stocks (assets). From a welfare policy perspective it is perhaps understandable 
that the focus has been on flows rather than on stocks as income is concerned 
with meeting present needs, but it is a narrow perspective which appears to be 
changing. There were some policy developments under the previous Labour 
Government which were designed around asset-based welfare and could be 
seen as a sign of a mature welfare state concerned with long term inequalities 
between individuals and families. The value of assets which an individual or a 
family holds is both an indication of their standard of living in the past as well 
as their future prospects. And it is the relationship between asset-holding and 
future prospects which we are particularly interested in. 
 
Given increases in earnings and income inequality it is not surprising that 
inequality in wealth increased in the UK over the last two decades. In 2000 the 
top 1% of the population held 23% of all personal wealth, an increase from 
18% in 1990 but this fell back to 21% in 2005 (figures from HMRC, table 13.5 
(Series C)). Not only do the wealthiest hold disproportionate shares of personal 
wealth but this is coupled with a significant proportion of the population 
holding no wealth at all. Evidence from the Wealth and Asset Survey (WAS) 
suggests that over 25% of all households had zero or negative financial assets 
in 2006-08 (Daffin, 2009). 
 
A further cause for concern arises from the possibility that assets play an 
important role in shaping individuals’ life chances, both in economic and non-
economic ways. If lack of access to assets means young people are unable to: 
invest in human capital, secure decent living conditions, start-up business 
ventures, instil a sense of well-being and security leading to ‘better’ long term 
outcomes, then inequalities will widen further. This can lead to re-enforcing 
cycles of deprivation among the more vulnerable groups in societies; 
especially, households on low incomes with children, single parents, or 
workless households, see (Piachaud and Sutherland 2000; Piachaud and 
Sutherland 2002) and (Gregg and Wadsworth 2000; Dickens, Wadsworth et al. 
2001; Dickens, Gregg et al. 2003). If young people are restricted in the choices 
they make in life at an early age, this can lead to sub-optimal outcomes during 
adult life. 
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The growing acceptance of the importance of assets above and beyond their 
pure monetary value has led to innovative policies, both in the UK and 
elsewhere. Asset-based welfare, as it has become known, represents a small but 
radical shift from traditional forms of welfare provision which have typically 
taken the form of income-transfers and service provision. Advocates of asset-
based approaches to welfare typically do not call for wholesale redistribution of 
assets but instead put forward policies which create the right environment for 
individuals (normally asset-poor) to accumulate assets. These have taken the 
form of small asset-transfers providing a base for individuals to build on or 
through matched saving schemes. One of the main promoters of this idea 
advocates asset accumulation, particularly amongst the more vulnerable income 
groups, purporting a broad range of attributes that constitute as assets including 
human, physical and social capital, see Sherraden (1991). This theme saw some 
support in the UK, with an emphasis on having access to financial assets that 
would enable the individual to pursue a wider choice of opportunities in life 
(Regan, 2001; Paxton, 2001; Paxton, 2003). The previous Labour Government, 
in its 1998 Budget report, advocated redressing inequalities in wealth and set an 
agenda focused on trying to provide equal opportunity for all (H.M. Treasury 
1998). There is some echo of this in the Coalition Government’s agenda. 
 
If it can be shown that assets play an important role in shaping individuals’ 
opportunities then inequalities in asset-holding will clearly come under the 
spotlight. Traditionally policies designed to encourage asset accumulation have 
tended to benefit better off families and individuals through, potentially 
increasing asset inequality. Recent policy initiatives have attempted to redress 
this imbalance by targeting lower income households. Various policies 
encouraging savings have been pursued with the intention of ensuring that all 
individuals have access to a sufficient minimum level of financial resources to 
enable a greater range of opportunities to be pursued, leading to better 
outcomes later in life.  
 
Although policy development can move at quite a pace there is very little hard 
statistical evidence to support asset-based welfare policies. The objective of the 
research undertaken in this study is to contribute to the knowledge base in this 
important area. More specifically, the empirical analysis presented in this paper 
is designed to examine the relationship between holding a financial asset in 
young adult life on outcomes in later life. We attempt to establish the causal 
effect of holding financial assets on various outcomes. We do not attempt to 
explain how financial assets should be spent to ensure better outcomes as this is 
beyond the scope of our data. This study does provide some evidence on 
whether there exist positive effects from holding an asset, over and above other 
individual and family circumstances and characteristics. We shall refer to this 
as the asset-effect.  
 
Most of the empirical research on the effects of holding assets on adult 
outcomes has been conducted in the US, much of which is descriptive or 
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examines different objectives, such as participation in civil society, impact on 
smoking, etc. Our analysis goes beyond existing work already undertaken on 
the asset-effect in the UK; there is one particularly influential study for which 
the findings are reported in Bynner (2000), Bynner and Paxton (2001) and 
Bynner and Despotidou (2000). This previous study used data from a British 
birth cohort study (the National Child Development Study) and examines the 
impact of holding an asset at age 23 years on a range of outcomes at age 33 
years, after controlling for a number of differences between individuals. The 
findings suggest that there is a positive correlation between asset-holding and 
outcomes in later life. These outcomes include socio-economic outcomes, such 
as health, employment and marital status; as well as social and civic 
involvement, such as political interest and voting. Another UK study uses the 
British Household Panel Study (McKay and Kempson 2003). These authors 
attempted to replicate the work by Bynner and Paxton (2001) and find evidence 
that holding assets have an effect on later outcomes; however, when they apply 
their own methodology, they report that no reliable effects of asset holdings on 
life outcomes were found. The problem with this study is that data in the BHPS 
do not allow them to estimate a true asset-effect. All they are able to do is to 
examine whether the presence of assets is associated with a change in 
behaviour. For example, they look at whether individuals with assets are more 
likely to stop smoking to a greater extent than individuals without assets. This 
greatly weakens the value of this study as the initial presence of assets may 
already have influenced the characteristics of interest, for example, whether or 
not individuals smoke in the first place, raising problems related to 
endogeneity. The result is that the two groups are unlikely to be random 
samples. In addition, if asset-rich individuals who smoke (for example) are 
different from asset-poor individuals who smoke, then whether or not they stop 
smoking may be completely unrelated to whether or not they hold an asset. 
Overall this means that the fact that they did not find a significant difference in 
the change in an outcome, that they could attribute to asset-holding, does not 
indicate a lack of an asset-effect. 
 
While existing research does provide some insight into the correlations 
between holding an asset and later outcomes, in the analysis presented here we 
employ more rigorous econometric regression techniques than previously 
applied to account for differences in individual and family circumstances and 
characteristics. The main difficulty with estimating the asset-effect is that 
individuals with assets can differ from individuals without assets in a number 
of important ways. For example, asset-rich individuals could be ‘better-off’ in a 
whole range of ways compared with asset-poor individuals and these other 
characteristics and attributes could also be correlated with, or indeed contribute 
directly to, the outcomes we are interested in exploring. We employ a number 
of econometric techniques to try and disentangle these different influences with 
the objective of identifying a pure asset-effect. 
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1.1 Objectives  
In this study we set out to provide more accurate estimates of the importance, 
or otherwise, of asset-holding on a range of economic and non-economic 
outcomes than have been available to date. We estimate whether there are any 
benefits in later life from having financial assets in early adulthood, after 
controlling for individuals’ characteristics and circumstances and whether or 
not asset-holders are a select group of individuals. If after controlling for 
individual and family characteristics there still exist significant positive effects 
on outcomes from holding an asset then there is an argument for policy 
interventions which encourage individual asset accumulation at some level. We 
also provide estimates on how long lasting any effects may be and provide 
some information on how large an asset needs to be to have a significant 
impact. We are not able to say how important the process of accumulation of 
assets is, nor how an asset is spent, as these are beyond the scope of the data we 
have available. As we only have snapshots of asset holding some individuals 
without assets may have had assets prior to these snapshots and others may 
have accumulated assets after the snapshots were taken and prior to the 
measured outcome. We are only able to address the question – did asset-
holding observed at these snapshots lead to improved outcomes? 
 
The data set used here, the National Child Development Study (NCDS), was 
originally conceived as a nationally representative sample of individuals all 
born in a week in March 1958. These individuals have been followed from 
birth, and interviews have been conducted at varying intervals through their 
childhood and their adult lives. This work builds on an earlier empirical study 
led by John Bynner (2000), which examined the impact of holding assets at age 
23 on a range of outcomes at age 33. We attempt to employ more sophisticated 
econometric techniques to control for individual characteristics and 
circumstances which may have an independent impact on the outcomes we are 
interested in. We also make use of the availability of another round of 
interviews which allows us to examine the impact of assets at age 23 on 
outcomes at age 42; and assets at 33 years on outcomes at age 42.  
 
1.2 Economic background 
In economics it has long been noted that there are disparities between the levels 
of current income and current expenditure over the lifecycle (see Modigliani 
and Brumberg, 1954 and Friedman, 1957 on the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) 
and the permanent income (PI) theories). The LCH model assumes that early in 
adult life, a typical person is likely to have expenditure above his/her current 
income, leading to dis-saving or debt. This is largely driven by the need to 
undertake costly investment in human capital before entering the labour 
market. Over the working life, individuals typically consume less than their 
income; thereby saving some of their current income for future consumption. 
These models predict several motives for savings: to provide resources to draw 
upon during retirement, precautionary savings for unexpected expenditure, 
deposits for assets such as consumer durables or property, and altruism through 
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intergenerational transfers both during the lifetime (intra vivos) and bequests. 
There are vast numbers of studies examining the importance of these different 
motivations and their significance across the population, which are not covered 
here (see Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981; Kotlikoff, 1988; and Bernheim, 
Schleifer et al., 1985, for intergenerational transfers and bequests). 
 
While perfect capital markets allow individuals to smooth expenditure against 
changes in income, through borrowing from financial institutions, the reality 
for many individuals or families on low incomes is that they are unable to 
obtain credit and are thus liquidity-constrained
1
. Empirical studies in the US 
provide evidence that a significant fraction of the US population is liquidity-
constrained. Transfers from family and friends are particularly important in 
easing the borrowing constraints of those liquidity constrained (Cox 1990; Cox 
and Japelli 1990). Young people required to make costly investments before 
entering the labour market lack the means to fund these investments from self-
generated income. To fund these investments they either have to borrow 
(against a future income stream) or rely on transfers from other family 
members (or in some cases non-family members). In some situations 
governments and/or employers fund or subsidize the investments (education 
and training). Low income families are themselves credit constrained and 
therefore this can lead to under-investment in human capital and lower lifetime 
earnings. There is much evidence that those who most need financial assistance 
have restricted access to funds available from financial institutions or credit 
facilities, and instead have to resort to moneylenders and credit institutions 
with unfavourable conditions associated with the risk of repayment, thereby 
reinforcing their financial disadvantage
2
. This is because loans made on this 
basis are both risky (higher future income is not guaranteed and risks may be 
higher for disadvantaged individuals) and these individuals are not able to 
provide any security for the loan (such as property or parental wealth). In 
addition, some studies have shown that those at the very bottom of the income 
distribution may be debt-averse and will not borrow to overcome their current 
liquidity constraints (Kempson and Whyley 1999; Kempson 2002).  
 
The emphasis on asset accumulation as a policy objective is not a new 
phenomenon and has appeared in various forms through the welfare state. 
Welfare policy is commonly understood to seek to remedy the failures of the 
market (Goodin, Headey et al. 1999). These failures include: ensuring 
assistance to those who fall below a minimum standard of living, providing 
assistance for those who face an unexpected large drop in living standards, and 
to assist in income-smoothing across the life-time. This latter objective 
                                              
1
  No liquid assets or borrowing facilities to fund current expenditure. 
2
  There is significant literature on this issue, particularly pertinent to developing 
countries, and the role for micro-credit institutions and rural micro-finance schemes 
with successful programmes such as the well-documented Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, which is not covered here. 
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involves the reallocation of individuals’ income (consumption) over their 
lifetime and includes redistribution from themselves at one point in their life-
cycle to themselves at another point, as in actuarial private pension schemes, or 
notional redistribution as an unfunded state pension scheme which embodies an 
intergenerational social contract (Glennerster, 2003; Barr 1998). Another 
welfare objective is to reduce inequality in living standards in two forms: 
vertical equity issues, which redistribute resources towards individuals or 
families on lower incomes; or, horizontal equity, where benefits take into 
account differences across individuals and equivalise the benefits (Boadway 
and Wildasin, 1996). In the UK during the 1980s, roughly three-quarters of all 
the redistribution of welfare spending achieved was of horizontal redistribution; 
only one-quarter was concerned with redistributing income to the lifetime poor, 
vertical redistribution (Falkingham and Hills, 1995). 
 
Financial assets in the form of savings are affected by many policies, including; 
taxation, system of social insurance especially pensions, health and disability 
insurance, welfare services and education, transfers of various sorts and debt 
policy (Boadway and Wildasin 1996). There are a variety of instruments for 
converting present consumption into future consumption: financial assets (debt, 
shares in firms, pension funds, annuities, mutual funds, insurance policies), real 
estate, unincorporated business assets, consumer durables (and housing), and 
even investment in human capital formation. The distinctions between the 
different savings instruments are relevant since they have different tax 
implications. Some studies have shown that in determining their life-time 
plans, individuals take into account the plan of the state. The state has a role in 
income-smoothing, whether through collecting taxes through PAYE system 
allocating resources through pensions. Since individuals determine their 
savings according to the State’s role, it has important considerations for the 
economy in general; aggregate savings affect aggregate investment in the 
economy, affecting economic activity and hence overall economic growth in 
the economy. Individuals’ and households’ saving behaviour also has 
implications for the well-being of future generations in terms of debt liabilities, 
for example (Barro, 1979; Kotlikoff, 1989; Boadway and Wildasin, 1996). 
Policies affecting savings amongst individuals can not only affect the life 
course of the individual but aggregate savings in the economy can have 
macroeconomic effects that carry over into the future, and hence it is important 
that such policies have the correct incentives. 
 
1.3 Policy Context 
As noted earlier, traditional forms of welfare policy have been income-based 
policies (transfers) or service provision and delivery. In an attempt to try and 
ensure more people can benefit from having savings (for the reasons outlined 
above) the previous Labour Government introduced incentives designed to 
encourage people, particularly those on a low income, to save (H.M. Treasury, 
2000; H.M. Treasury, 2001a; H.M. Treasury, 2001b). These have included a 
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variety of policies such as: the introduction of stakeholder pension schemes
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and Individual Savings Account (ISAs) and making savings products more 
accessible and transparent. However, most of the policies which are designed to 
encourage people to save and hold assets tend to favour those on higher 
incomes because they most often take the form of tax relief. The very poor do 
not benefit from tax relief policies since their gross income is often below the 
threshold at which income tax is levied. It is generally felt that the very poorest 
are unlikely to be able to create sufficient levels of savings to be able to escape 
poverty, whatever the level of tax relief, and that encouraging expenditure 
switching from essential subsistence-level expenditure into savings could be 
detrimental to the individual. Notwithstanding this, the absence of savings is in 
itself not a reflection of an individual’s lack of future planning or risk aversion 
but, as implied in the life cycle hypothesis, could be the optimal solution given 
the individual’s present circumstances or may be due to imperfections in the 
capital market or disincentives in the social security system. 
 
What is concerning is the inability of some individuals to be able to save for 
future expenditure or borrow when necessary which may lead to individuals 
being unable to maximize their income and utility over their lifecycle, and thus 
lead to sub-optimal outcomes in later life for both the individual and society. 
As well at the direct gains from what savings can acquire, it is claimed that 
there are benefits from the process of accumulating an asset, in terms of the 
financial discipline and long term planning process, as well as benefits from 
having a financial asset which provides security and empowerment from being 
able to draw on these reserves (Paxton 2001). The previous government 
asserted that holding financial assets has an ‘independent effect on young 
peoples’ chances in life’ (H.M. Treasury 2001c; p12), irrespective of what 
assets can acquire, above and beyond such factors as their social class, 
background or educational achievement, and that having assets and engaging in 
the process of saving could be associated with a range of beneficial effects. 
 
The act of saving reflects an individual’s ability/desire to plan for the future 
and provides them with a degree of security which can allow them to choose 
riskier options which can ultimately lead to greater benefits in the long run. 
Some argue that if improving the welfare of individuals is the objective, then 
providing assets or financial incentives to save for those who are not currently 
saving is not necessarily the most efficient way of tackling this issue. An 
alternative would be to provide those on low incomes with a greater current 
income to allow them to decide how much to consume today and how much to 
save for the future. On the other hand if young peoples’ access to an asset is 
one of the transmission mechanisms of intergenerational mobility, welfare 
packages that provided assets to young adults could increase intergenerational 
mobility without going through the long drawn out process of saving and 
                                              
3
  To be superseded by the low-cost National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) being 
introduced from 2012 under the 2008 Pensions Act. 
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accumulation of an asset after the time when it would be most effective 
(Emmerson and Wakefield 2001). 
 
There have been various targeted saving schemes, introduced in a number of 
countries, designed to assist low income families or individuals. Most of these 
schemes are means-tested in some way and involve the Government making a 
contribution to the individual’s saving account. The amount is usually 
proportionate to the value the individuals have saved themselves; often called 
matched savings. Many of the schemes also provide compulsory classes on 
financial advice and education, and many have restrictions as to what the 
savings can be used for when they are withdrawn. In most cases the savings can 
be put towards either educational programmes, housing or small businesses. 
These schemes include: the well-documented Individual Development 
Accounts (IDA) in the US (Sherraden, 2000; Sherraden, 2001; Silva, 2002); in 
Canada the learn$ave, introduced in 2000; in Ireland in 2001 local banks 
teamed up with the Government to increase national savings rate through 
matched savings at a rate of £1 for every £4 saved per month; in Puerto Rico, a 
limited scheme open to residents of the public housing system were offered 1:1 
matched savings though with uses of the fund limited to housing and education; 
and, in Taiwan in 2000 a limited number of participants were offered for a 
limited period deposits in their Family Development Accounts with a 1:1 
matched savings rate. Until now the information relating to the progress of each 
of the schemes has largely focused on the amount of savings or what the 
savings have been used for. There is little evaluation evidence on how savings 
have changed the lives of the beneficiaries. 
 
In many countries the beneficiaries of these programmes are children. The 
savings account is in the name of the child, and although others can make 
deposits into the account, savings can only be withdrawn by the account holder 
when they reach maturity or be used for specific items to benefit the child. In 
Singapore a Baby Bonus scheme was introduced in 2001 (enhanced in 2004 
and 2008). The scheme offers 1:1 matched savings when parents contribute to a 
Children’s Development Account (CDA); up to various caps depending on the 
birth order. The savings in the accounts can be used for educational or medical-
related expenses for the child (or another child in the family) up to the age of 6. 
In addition, in an attempt to boost fertility rates, the scheme provides a cash 
payment of S$4,000 each for the first and second child, and S$6,000 each for 
the third and fourth child.  
 
In the UK, governments have promoted the need to save throughout the life 
time through the development of a series of savings products suitable for 
various stages of the life cycle, to both increase the incentives to save and to 
empower individuals to make informed and responsible saving choices. Other 
than pension schemes, which are designed for long-term saving for use during 
retirement and the already established Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), the 
previous Labour Government developed two tax-advantaged savings schemes: 
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the Saving Gateway (SG) and the Child Trust Fund (CTF) (H.M. Treasury 
2003). The former was aimed at providing incentives for lower-income earners 
to save by offering to match savings with additional contributions paid by the 
Government. It was announced in the 2003 Budget that the Child Trust Fund 
would provide every child born from September 2002 with an initial 
endowment at birth of £250, with £500 for children in the poorest third of 
families, who also qualify for the full Child Tax Credit
4
. At the age of 7 the 
Government made a further contribution to the fund for lower income 
households claiming Child Tax Credit. Additional contributions can be made 
by other family and non-family members, up to an annual limit of £1,200. In 
contrast with most other schemes of this type, there are no restrictions on the 
use of the asset when the child reaches maturity, but only the child can access 
the fund at age 18, including the additional contributions (H.M. Treasury 
2003). The Child Trust Fund was abolished by the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government and phased-out from August 2010 A new tax-
exempt, but not endowed, Junior ISA was announced in the Coalition 
Government’s 2011 budget and is due to be introduced in November 2011. 
Money invested in the Junior ISA will be locked in and only available to the 
child when they reach 18. 
 
In August 2002 a pilot of the Savings Gateway began in five regions around the 
country. As well as the, then, Department for Education and Skill, the pilots 
were run in partnership with the Community Finance and Learning Initiative. 
Administered through Halifax plc, the accounts lasted for 18 months and, 
within certain limits, each pound saved by participants were matched by a 
pound from the Government. Participants were able to save a maximum of £25 
per month up to an overall account limit of £375 of savings, £750 with 
matching funds. Tailored financial information and education was provided 
along with the accounts to enable individuals to make informed savings 
decisions. The results from the evaluation of the pilot schemes were used to 
design the Savings Gateway scheme on a national basis
5
. The scheme was due 
to be rolled out nationally in July 2010 but was scrapped by the Coalition 
Government.  
 
These savings programmes in the UK and elsewhere illustrate the variety of 
tools that have been designed to try and encourage the saving habit as well as 
providing financial incentives to increase the size of savings for those on lower 
incomes. The purpose of the accumulated assets are usually not prescribed but 
                                              
4
  Child Tax Credit was introduced in 2002 and is an income-related support for 
families with children, replacing the child element of: the Working Families Tax 
Credit, the Disabled Person’s Tax Credit, Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance, 
and the Children’s Tax Credit. 
5
  See 
(http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/topics/topics_savings/topics_savings_savgateway.cf
m). 
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it is hoped that they will put individuals on a more secure financial footing, 
provide something to fall back on in times of need, and to make investments 
which can have long lasting effects for the individuals and their families. 
 
2. Data 
In this study we make use of the rich information available in the National 
Child Development Study (NCDS). This is an on-going study which follows a 
nationally representative sample of individuals who were born during one week 
in March 1958. The survey consists of a series of interviews, and in some cases 
questionnaires, administered to the selected individuals themselves as well as to 
their parents and teachers, even from the midwife, during the early years. In 
addition a number of medical and educational tests have been administered 
over the years. From the interviews information is collected on a range of 
aspects: socio-economic characteristics, income, education, health, housing and 
employment. For details of the NCDS see Shepherd (1995). 
 
The main surveys were carried out at birth in 1958, and then at age 7 (1965), 
age 11 (1969), age 16 (1974), age 23 (1981), age 33 (1991), age 42 (2000) and 
two further surveys have been conducted, which we do not include in this 
study, age 46 (2004) and age 50 (2008). As is the case with all surveys which 
attempt to track the same individuals over a period of time, some of the 
individuals do not take part in all of the surveys and some leave the study all 
together. The loss of individuals is commonly known as attrition, and can result 
from the inability of the survey team to keep in touch with individuals (for 
example when they move house) or when individuals choose to stop 
participating in the study. Of the 17,416 individuals first surveyed in 1958, 
12,537 were interviewed at age 23; 11,407 were interviewed at age 33; and 
11,419 were interviewed at age 42. The loss of individuals is not necessarily a 
problem if attrition is random. In cases where there is a greater propensity for 
certain types of individual to drop out of the study the sample then becomes a 
select group of the original random sample and no longer a representative 
sample. We consider this possibility in the analysis presented below. Although 
in total a larger number of individuals were interviewed in each year, we have 
to restrict the sample to individuals from the original sample
6
 who responded at 
age 23 and 33; or age 23 and 42; or age 33 and 42, and who provided key 
information on asset-holding and the outcome variables of interest (see below). 
 
One of the main difficulties when estimating the types of models we are 
interested in estimating here is the lack of information in a particular dataset. 
Finding sufficient variables to separately identify the selection equation is one 
of the greatest challenges. We are very fortunate with the NCDS as individuals 
                                              
6
  Some individuals in the survey do not appear in the original sample because they 
were born outside the United Kingdom. 
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have been followed over many years we are able to draw on information from 
previous surveys. For example, we have attitudinal information when 
respondents were young which we can use to ascertain their attitude to risk and 
autonomy well before we observe their asset-holding and we are able to use 
this information to identify the asset equation.  
 
2.1 Financial Savings Information 
This study explores the impact of holding assets (financial savings and 
investments) at age 23 and age 33 on later outcomes. The main reason for 
examining financial savings at age 23 is that this is the first year that detailed 
information on individuals’ finances was collected. Age 23 is a point in an 
individual’s life by which time he/she may have accumulated some savings, as 
well as being early enough in the start of their adult life in which choices about 
the future are being made. Although age 23 may initially appear a completely 
arbitrary age for which to focus on savings, and data alone constrains us to 
using this year, there is little evidence to suggest this is an atypical point to be 
examining savings of young adults (Banks and Rohwedder, 2001). We extend 
this to look at asset holding at age 33 and the impact of asset holding at age 33 
on age 42 outcomes. 
 
We also make use of important information available on individuals’ work and 
economic activity histories which are clearly important as they are likely to 
provide an indication of resources available to individuals and could also have 
a direct impact on the outcome variables. Much work has been done in forming 
a monthly account of the labour market status of individuals (Galindo-Rueda, 
2002), and we exploit this information in our analysis
7
. Since employment 
income is likely to be highly correlated with financial assets, individuals’ 
activity history provides a useful contribution to the missing information.  
 
The information on assets at age 23 and 33 has been collected in two ways. 
Firstly, according to the type of account in which the money is held in and, 
secondly, by who the account holder is. Initial examination of the data by 
account type revealed that there are many accounts with very small amounts of 
money deposited in them. 
 
Savings were defined in the survey as money held in: 
 Building Society 
 National Savings Certificates 
 Post Office Savings Bank 
 Bank Deposit or Savings Account 
 Trustee Savings Bank/Savings Account 
 Government Save as you Earn (SAYE) 
                                              
7
  We are indebted to Fernando Galindo-Rueda for making these data available to us. 
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 Premium Bonds 
 Any other savings 
 
Investments were defined in the survey as money held in: 
 Company Shares or Securities 
 Unit Trusts or Investment Trusts 
 Government Stocks and Securities 
 Local Authority Bonds and Securities 
 Property (Bricks and Mortar) other than main residence 
 Any other investments 
 
It is important to distinguish between savings that individuals keep in accounts 
that they have ready access to (liquid), or whether savings are kept in accounts 
designed as longer-term savings vehicles (illiquid). In this analysis, we are also 
interested in money that is kept aside to cover more than small, one-off, 
expenditures. For this reason we have utilised the information available by 
account type and imposed a minimum cut off below which we have deemed an 
insufficient amount to be classified as assets for this study, although in some of 
the analysis we consider total financial assets with no minimum restriction. For 
liquid savings we apply a cut-off of £200
8
 or more (at age 23 in 1981). We 
considered a number of different cut-offs and concluded that this amount was a 
reasonable amount for an average 23 year old, in 1981, to hold to cover fairly 
small out-goings
9
. Further support for this cut-off comes from previous 
research which suggests that assets above a minimum cut-off in the region of 
£100-£200 (in 1981) were associated with a boost in the positive outcomes and 
a reduction in negative outcomes (Bynner and Despotidou, 2000). Across all 
investment accounts (illiquid savings), an aggregate amount of £100
10
 or more 
(at age 23 in 1981) has been classified as active savings. We have chosen a 
lower threshold for illiquid savings to reflect the fact that these savings are 
more likely to represent saving for expenditures in the future since they have 
been placed in savings vehicles designed for longer term investment. Savings 
by account holder (definition 2) have also been calculated and are provided in 
the summary tables below to illustrate that there has been no loss of generality 
by choosing information by account type. For comparability with the account 
type information, information from account holder has been explored by 
aggregating the amount in the accounts that the individual has access to. This 
includes savings and investment accounts that are in the individual’s name, 
individual and spouse’s name and individual and other. Again accounts that are 
                                              
8
  £357 in 1991, £456 in 2000 and £598 in 2010 (RPI all items index). 
9
  Average net monthly pay for employees in this birth cohort at age 23 was £312 in 
1981. 
10
  £179 in 1991, £228 in 2000 and £299 in 2010 (RPI all items index). 
13 
 
considered inactive have been excluded by imposing a minimum cut-off; this is 
less than £200 for savings accounts and less than £100 for investment accounts 
in 1981. 
 
In all of the analysis we concentrate on gross financial assets. This means that 
we do not consider debt. Clearly individuals with debts may be required to use 
some or all of their financial assets to pay off these debts but to some extent 
they have a choice and it is very common for individuals to simultaneously 
hold financial assets and debts. We choose to analyse gross financial assets 
because this will give us the best guide to the potential impact of asset-based 
welfare policies designed to increase financial assets (eg as the Child Trust 
Fund and the Saving Gateway were designed to do) as these policies increase 
gross financial assets.  
 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we present some of the descriptive statistics relating to the 
complete cohort and for the samples used in this study.  
 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the features of the NCDS 
data. The sample size is quite large; covering over 11,400 individuals in each 
year, with equal participation of men and women. Attrition is a significant 
problem with 28% of individuals surveyed in 1974 not present in the 1991 or 
2000 surveys; attrition is higher among men. However, the problem of attrition 
for those for whom we have asset information in 1981 and for outcomes in 
1991 and 2000 is relatively small: 14% of those with outcome information have 
no corresponding information on assets for the 1991 data, and 15% for 2000 
data. 
 
In the 1981 dataset when the cohort was aged 23, about three-quarters of the 
respondents came from a social class background of skilled manual or with 
lower levels of skill (based on father’s occupation at birth of respondent). A 
little over one-third of individuals have little or no qualifications at age 23 
years, though the figure is slightly higher for men, at 41%. Around 10% of men 
and women have a higher education qualification. About half the sample is 
single at 23 years old. The figure for men is lower at 41%, while as many as 
54% of women are married at age 23. Over three-quarters of the sample have 
no children, though around 9% have two or more children at age 23. 
 
The 1991 sample (aged 33) is spread across the whole of Great Britain, with 
around 30% living in London and South East regions. The percentage of cohort 
members who are single at age 33 fell to 17%, with, on average, 68% of the 
sample now married and 10% divorced. Interestingly, of the sample who 
responded to the survey at age 33, a greater proportion of respondents has no or 
low qualifications. This suggests that there have been differential rates of 
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attrition, maybe because the more highly qualified are more mobile and 
therefore harder to trace. As you would expect, the share of the sample with 
further education qualifications and above has increased. Looking at social 
class of individuals at age 33, it can be seen that only around half belong to 
skilled manual or lower categories. However, the percentage of observations 
with information missing for social class category is as high as 10%, with the 
percentage of missing for men as high as 13%. 
 
Table 1 summarises the main outcome variables examined in this study. The 
types of outcomes that we are interested in examining in later adult life capture 
both monetary and non-monetary aspects to reflect a broad concept of well-
being. Through examining outcomes in the labour market; wage rate and 
employment status, we capture some aspect of material well-being, while by 
examining health outcomes; malaise scores and self-reported general health, we 
capture a more general concept of physical and psychological well-being. The 
samples are restricted to those individuals who answered the asset question at 
age 23. 
 
For economic outcomes we look at employment status and hourly wages. Due 
to data limitations we have to limit our analysis of wages to employees, and 
even among employees there are a significant number of observations with 
missing wage information; a problem that is not unique to the NCDS.  
 
For non-economic outcomes we examine two different health measures. Firstly, 
we explore a measure of malaise. This is the aggregation of 24 specified 
questions covering physical and psychological ailments (see Appendix C for 
the list of questions asked). This indicator, commonly known as the Malaise 
Inventory, has been used extensively in both medical and social science fields 
(Rutter, Tizard et al., 1970; Rutter, Tizard et al., 1976; Richman, 1978; 
Rodgers, Pickles et al., 1999). It has been shown that a score of 1 to 7 indicates 
that an individual is suffering from some type of malaise, while a score of 8 is 
indicative of non-clinical depression (a high risk of psychiatric morbidity). This 
variable contrasts with the question on general health, which reflects the 
individual’s subjective assessment of their own general health.  
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Table 1: Overview of Outcomes at age 33 and 42 
Outcomes Total Male Female 
At 33 years old %/£ %/£ %/£ 
Economic Status    
Full-Time employment 53.0 74.3 33.0 
Part-time employment 15.4 0.7 29.2 
Self-employment 11.4 16.3 6.9 
Unemployment 3.7 5.6 2.0 
Full-time education 0.6 0.3 0.8 
Out of the Labour Force 15.3 2.3 27.6 
Other 0.6 0.5 0.7 
Wage    
Average wage (actual) £6.28 £7.39 £5.23 
Malaise score    
Malaise (score=0) 31.3 36.3 26.7 
Malaise (score <8) 62.0 59.3 64.6 
Non-clinical depression score (8-24) 6.6 4.4 8.7 
General Health    
Excellent 34.9 36.6 33.3 
Good 52.0 50.8 53.5 
Fair 11.3 11.1 11.5 
Poor 1.6 1.5 1.8 
At 42 years old No. (%) (%) 
Economic Status    
Full-time Employment 55.8 71.8 40.8 
Part-time employment 17.0 1.4 31.5 
Self-employment 12.7 18.1 7.7 
Unemployment 2.1 2.8 1.5 
Full-time education 0.5 0.2 0.7 
Out of the Labour Force 11.1 5.1 16.8 
Other 0.8 0.6 1.0 
Wage    
Average wage (actual) £10.47 £12.61 £8.36 
Malaise score    
No malaise (score=0) 19.6 23.6 15.9 
Malaise (score <8) 67.7 66.5 68.9 
Non-clinical depression score (8-24) 12.7 10.0 15.2 
General Health    
Excellent 30.3 30.9 29.7 
Good 52.1 51.5 52.7 
Fair 14.2 14.4 14.1 
Poor 3.4 3.2 3.5 
Source: NCDS 1991, 2000 
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Looking at economic outcomes, the percentage of the sample engaged in full-
time employment at age 33 is 53%, rising to 56% at age 42. However there is 
quite a disparity between men and women, with 74% of men in full-time 
employment at age 33, falling to 72% of the sample in 2000 at age 42. For 
women, 41% of the sample is engaged in full-time employment at age 42, 
which is an increase from 33% at age 33. Women have a higher rate of part-
time employment; 29% at age 33 compared to less than 1% for men; and 32% 
at age 42 for women while for men part-time employment share remains 
unchanged. However, men have around double the unemployment rate than 
women at age 33 and 42. There is also great disparity in the out of the labour 
force (OLF) rates across gender; 28% for women at age 33 compared to 2% for 
men; while at age 42 it has fallen slightly for women, to 17% (part-time 
employment however increased between 33 and 42 years) and increases to 5% 
for men. Average actual wages increased between 1991 and 2000, average 
wages of women are 70% and 66% of men’s, respectively.  
 
Interestingly, in both years, on average, around two-thirds of the sample 
experience some sort of malaise age 33, though by age 42 the percentage 
showing signs of non-clinical depression has approximately doubled to 13%. 
This increase in malaise could be a function of ageing. At both ages the 
percentage showing signs of non-clinical depression is higher for women than 
for men. However, again in both years the percentage claiming to have good or 
even better health is over three-quarters of the respective samples. Unlike the 
malaise scores, there is little variation across men and women in general health 
outcomes. 
 
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics relating to asset holdings among the 
age 23 sample. Aggregating liquid and illiquid savings together, it can be seen 
that around 74% of the population have some form of savings. This is 
consistent with findings from other studies which suggest that 32-37% of adults 
aged over 16 have no formal savings, see Kempson (1998). Approximately 7% 
of the population (1.5m households) in Britain were found not to have a current 
account, nor any savings, credit or insurance (Kempson and Whyley, 1999). 
 
However, if we impose a cut off of £100 for liquid assets and £200 for illiquid 
assets below which savings are not counted and assumed to be either idle 
balances or used for current expenditure, it can be seen that less than half this 
age 23 cohort, 47%, have a significant amount of savings, which we refer to as 
‘active’ financial assets. Around one-fifth of this age 23 cohort had financial 
assets worth over £1,000 in 1981. Approximately 18% of the sample had assets 
between £1,000 and £10,000, while around 2% have over £10,000. Women 
have less savings and investments then men but the differences between men 
and women are marginal. 
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Table 2: Asset holdings at age 23 (1981 values) 
23 yrs old Assets Holdings Total Male Female 
  %/£ %/£ %/£ 
Savings All with asset 73.7 73.6 72.4 
 Asset (£200+) 44.2 45.1 43.3 
 Average +ve Amt £869 £928 £810 
  Avg. Amt (£200+) £1,399 £1,479 £1,316 
Investments All with assets 6.9 8.4 5.4 
 Asset (£100) 6.2 7.5 4.9 
 Average +ve Amt £6,379 £5,916 £7,095 
  Avg. Amt (£100+) £7,104 £6,624 £7,836 
Mortgage or 
housing loan 
All 26.7 20.6 32.9 
Mortgage/loan 
& Sav+Inv 
All with active assets 62.1 60.8 63.3 
Inheritance With Asset >£500 11.1 10.2 12.0 
 Avg. Value >£500 £2,816 £2,899 £2,746 
Savings £0 27.0 26.4 27.6 
 Less than £200 28.8 28.6 29.1 
 £200-£1,000 26.5 26.2 26.7 
 £1,000 - £3,000 13.5 14.0 13.0 
 £3,000+ 4.1 4.9 3.6 
Investments £0 93.1 91.7 94.6 
 Less than £100 1.3 1.6 1.1 
 £100-£1,000 2.0 2.6 1.4 
 £1,000 - £3,000 1.2 1.4 1.0 
 £3,000+ 2.4 2.8 1.9 
Combined With Asset 73.6 74.2 73.0 
(Sav. +Inv.) Asset (active) 46.5 47.8 45.1 
 Avg. +ve Amt £1,452 £1,579 £1,325 
 Avg. +ve Amt 
(active) 
£2,273 £2,427 £2,110 
Grouped £0 26.1 25.5 26.8 
 Less than £100 19.8 19.2 20.4 
 £100-£500 22.1 21.7 22.6 
 £500-£1,000 11.6 11.7 11.4 
 £1,000 - £3,000 13.8 14.3 13.2 
 £3,000 - £10,000 4.5 5.2 3.7 
 £10,000 + 2.1 2.4 1.9 
Source: NCDS 1981 
Note: £100 in 1981 was worth approximately £300 in 2010 
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Around 27% of individuals in the survey have a mortgage or housing loan at 
age 23: higher for women at 33%. This difference is no doubt related to the fact 
that a higher percentage of women than men are married and have children at 
age 23 in this cohort. Not surprisingly it is those individuals who have savings 
or an investment above the minimum cut-offs who are more likely (much more 
likely) to be buying a house through a mortgage or loan: 62% on average. 
 
The percentage of the age 23 sample that had received an inheritance or a gift 
from another person to the value of £500 or more was 11%. The average value 
of the largest inheritance or gift received by these individuals was £2,816.  
 
These figures are consistent with the findings in McKay and Kempson (2003) 
who found, using the BHPS, a nationally representative dataset over all age 
groups 1991-2000; that on average 39-43% of respondents were saving at any 
given time.  
 
4. Methodology 
Without having the advantage of results from a randomized experiment, where 
one group of individuals is randomly assigned assets and another group is not, 
which would allow us to identify the impact of asset-holding independent from 
the influence of other factors, we have to employ statistical techniques to try to 
identify the ‘asset-effect’. The main challenge is to compute an estimate of the 
counterfactual. A simple comparison of the outcomes between asset-holders 
and those without assets could be very misleading. If individuals with assets 
have other favourable attributes (e.g. more advantaged backgrounds or higher 
levels of education) then a positive association between assets and outcomes 
could be spurious. Where such attributes are observable a regression model can 
be estimated controlling for these differences and isolating the asset-effect. If 
such characteristics are unobservable regression estimates will suffer from 
omitted variable bias. Similarly estimates would be biased and inconsistent if 
individuals accumulated assets for the purpose of improving outcomes. In this 
case we say that the individual decision to accumulate and hold an asset is 
endogenous by which we mean that in some sense asset-holding and the 
outcome of interest are jointly determined. It is also possible that those 
individuals most likely to benefit from having an asset are those individuals 
who accumulate assets. 
 
To estimate the pure asset-effect we would like to know what the 
counterfactuals are; that is we would like to know what the outcomes would 
have been for individuals with assets had they not had assets, thereby allowing 
us to calculate the difference the asset made. Likewise for individuals without 
assets, we would like to know what their outcomes would have been had they 
had an asset, thereby allowing us to calculate the difference an asset would 
have had.  
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There are many reasons why we think that financial asset holding is not 
random. Individuals differ in both their desire and ability to accumulate and/or 
acquire assets. This is a problem when estimating the impact of asset holding 
on outcomes to the extent to which individuals’ desire to hold assets is 
influenced by the extent to which they (correctly) believe they will benefit from 
the asset (to the extent that individuals have a choice, they self-select) and these 
individuals systematically have other unobserved attributes which affect the 
likelihood that they will hold assets and the outcome of interest (asset holding 
is endogenous). 
 
Previous research has estimated simple regression outcome equations including 
as many relevant control variables as possible. The problem is that not all the 
factors which are likely to affect the outcomes of interest are observable or 
available in the data and the issue of endogeneity is not addressed. We 
approach this problem in a slightly different way drawing on techniques used in 
other areas of economics. We begin by thinking about the estimation problem 
being one where there is a choice variable (asset-holding) and where the choice 
is both directly and indirectly correlated with the outcome of interest (i.e. it is 
endogenous) – there is self-selection and it is endogenous. The technique we 
employ has previously been used to estimate the impact of active labour market 
programmes on future employment, where participation in the programme is 
voluntary and those most likely to benefit from the programme (in the 
knowledge of this or otherwise) are more likely to volunteer to participate (i.e. 
participation is non-random and endogenous). This is often referred to as the 
treatment effects model (see Greene, 1997, for details) and is a form of control 
function estimation
11
. The control function method directly models what is 
technically known as the assignment rule to control for self-selection. This 
method directly analyses the choice problem facing individuals deciding on 
asset-holding.  
 
This method uses the specification of the decision function (choice) together 
with an excluded ‘instrument’ (or set of instruments from the outcome 
equation) to derive a control function, which fully controls for endogenous 
selection. The assumption is that any impact of the variables predicting the 
decision to hold assets on potential outcomes arises through the unobservable 
component in the participation equation together with the observable decision 
status. The challenge is to find a suitable ‘instrument’. 
 
The rationale for using this technique is two-fold. Firstly, it is hypothesised that 
factors affecting the decision or ability to acquire and hold assets also affect the 
outcome variable under analysis
12
. This means that those individuals who have 
                                              
11
  The term treatment effect comes from the use of this and similar statistical techniques 
to evaluate medical trials where treatment denotes to medical treatment. 
12
  This assumption is in fact tested in the empirical analysis, described later, but the 
initial hypothesis of a positive (negative) correlation between earnings and general 
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the choice and/or the ability to acquire or accumulate assets in early adulthood 
are either more or less likely to benefit from holding an asset.  
 
Without controlling for endogenous self-selection bias, Ordinary Least Squares 
regression estimates will over- or under-estimate the effect on the outcome 
variable (Maddala, 1983; Dolton and Makepeace, 1987; Greene, 1997; 
Heckman, Tobias et al., 2000).  
 
We compare the results we obtain from the treatment effects model with those 
obtained from instrumental variable models. The instrumental variable method 
is the standard econometric approach to endogeneity, where an explanatory 
variable is correlated with the error term. Explanatory variables can be 
correlated with the error term in a number of circumstances: where there exists 
reverse causation (the outcome (dependent variable) causes individuals to hold 
assets (the independent variable) in this case); where there are important 
omitted variables, and where there exists measurement error. In these cases 
OLS generally produces biased and inconsistent results. This method relies on 
exclusion restrictions to achieve identification. To achieve identification it is 
necessary to find at least one variable (instrument) that is correlated with the 
endogenous explanatory variable and is not correlated with the error term in the 
explanatory equation – i.e. the ‘instrument’ only affects the outcome of interest 
through its effect on the endogenous explanatory variable. Some analysts rely 
on the non-linearity introduced in models through the selection correction term 
to achieve identification but in many cases this can be very weak and lacks 
theoretical validity. Identification through the assumption of non-linearity from 
the selection correction term is even more problematic when the choice 
function extends beyond the binary decision to a multiple selection model. 
Where the cut-offs are finite (most notably in the interior range) the selection 
correction term can be linear and identification is not achieved (Chiburis and 
Lokshin, 2007). The challenge is to find appropriate variables which predict 
asset-holding but do not directly affect the outcomes of interest.  
 
In a simple linear constant parameter model the IV estimator identifies the 
treatment effect (technically the Local Average Treatment Effect), i.e. where 
the treatment effect is homogeneous. In a heterogeneous treatment effect model 
the IV estimator will only identify the average treatment effect under strong 
assumptions and ones that are unlikely to hold in practice (Blundell and Costa-
Dias, 2008).  
 
We contrast the findings from simple regression models with models that 
attempt to control for endogeneity and self-selection and with the simple 
summary statistics in the raw data and discuss the methodological challenges 
involved in this type of estimation. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
health (malaise) outcomes and assets follows from the work of Bynner (2000). 
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4.1 Estimation Models 
TREATMENT EFFECTS MODEL 
For the reasons outlined above we choose to estimate the asset-effect using 
what is known as the treatment effects model (Greene 1997). 
 
The treatment effects model consists of two parts: 
i)  modelling the probability of holding an asset (this can be extended to 
different levels of assets); and, 
ii)  estimating the impact of asset-holding on outcomes while correcting for 
differences across individuals in the probability of holding an asset. 
 
The relationship between assets and outcomes can be described as follows: 
 
 (1) 
 
where Yi is the outcome variable of interest, xi, is a vector of exogenous 
explanatory variables and zi indicates the presence of assets, where 
 
zi =1 if individual i has an asset and 0 otherwise 
 
The probability of holding an asset can be expressed as: 
 
 (2) 
   
 
 
The binary decision to acquire assets zi is modelled as the outcome of an 
unobserved latent variable, zi*. It is assumed that zi* is a linear function of the 
exogenous covariates wi and a random component ui,  
where ε and u are bivariate normal with mean zero and covariance matrix: 
 
 (3) 
 
Since the error εi in (1) is believed to be correlated with the outcome variable, 
we need to correct for this bias by finding variables that are associated with 
holding an asset at one age, but are not associated with the outcomes of interest 
at a later age. 
 
The expected value of ε varies between individuals with and without assets and 
is not equal to zero.  
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Due to the conditions just specified, the coefficient on the asset variable in the 
outcome equation, , does not capture the impact of assets-holding on the 
outcome variable. 
 
Rather the expected outcome for individuals with assets can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
                   (5) 
 
where   and Ф are the standard normal density and distribution functions 
respectively. 
 
The expected outcome for individuals without assets can be expressed as: 
 
 (6) 
 
The result we are interested in is the difference in expected outcomes between 
individuals with and without assets: 
 
 (7) 
 
This can also be re-written as: 
 
 (8) 
 
E[ε|zi=1] = E[ε|zi=0] =0 (9) 
 
If zi is exogenous then cov(ε, u) = 0 (i.e. ρ=0), where there is no correlation 
between holding an asset in stage 1 and outcomes in stage 2, then OLS 
estimation would be the appropriate estimation method to use. Where zi is 
endogenous in the case where cov(ε, u) ≠ 0 and ρ≠0 the sign of ρ determines 
the sign of the bias. In this case ρσλ represents the bias and the omission of this 
correction term in an OLS regression will lead to omitted-variable bias and the 
results will generally be inconsistent. 
 
These equations outline the basic treatment effects model. Our asset variables 
and outcome variables take a number of different forms. The simplest model 
involves estimating a binary selection model and a continuous outcome 
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variable. This is the case when we consider the impact of holding an asset on 
hourly wages. As we are interested in looking at different levels of asset-
holding and binary and ordered outcome variables (employment, malaise, 
general health) we have had to program the likelihood functions for these 
different models as they are not routine programmes found in standard 
statistical estimation software packages. Appendix A details the different 
models we have made use of in this study. 
 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE MODEL 
The method of Instrumental Variables deals directly with the case where an 
explanatory variable is endogenous (correlated with the error term). The IV 
approach requires the existence of at least one regressor exclusive to the 
decision rule. This is known as the instrument, w. It affects the decision to hold 
assets only and so is not one of the observable regressors in the outcome 
equation (X). This is known as the exclusion restriction. Under various 
conditions the instrument w is the source of exogenous variation used to 
approximate randomisation. The IV estimator is: 
 
δIV=(Z΄X)-1Z΄y 
 
While the IV model successfully deals directly with endogeneity, in practice it 
is very difficult to find suitable instruments that meet the conditions of the 
model. As the variance-covariance matrix of the IV estimator is larger than that 
of the OLS estimator, by an amount that is inversely related to the correlation 
between the instrument and the regressor (the endogenous variable), the 
strength of the instrument(s) is crucial in minimizing the variance of the IV 
estimator (Kennedy, 1998).  
 
There are clearly similarities between the IV model and the treatment effects 
model. The treatment effects model gains identification through exclusion 
restrictions in the selection equation (sometimes known as the treatment or 
participation equation) and the joint distribution of the error term (bivariate 
normal) while the IV model relies on the validity of the instruments. 
 
4.2 Identification and model diagnostics 
Before estimating the models, we need to ensure they are correctly specified. 
The two-stage approach used in the treatment effects model is similar to a two-
stage instrumental variable model (two stage least squares 2SLS) and all of our 
models require the separate identification of the ‘asset equation’. While 
technically selection models like the treatment effects model can achieve 
identification through the joint distributional assumption relating to the error 
term a valid exclusion restriction provides a sound theoretical base for the 
model and strengthens the model. 
 
We can interpret the first stage of the regression, which in this case is the 
probability of an individual holding an asset at age 23/33, to be similar to 
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estimating the exogenous variables that are used to determine the instrument. 
Without interpreting either the significant variables or the efficiency of the 
estimation, we can test whether the first stage estimation is a robust model of 
holding an asset by testing whether the variables chosen for the instruments 
over-identify the model. The C statistic, or difference-in-Sargan statistic, 
allows a test of a subset of the orthogonality conditions, i.e. it is a test of the 
exogeneity of one or more instruments. It is defined as the difference of the 
Hansen-Sargan statistics of the unrestricted and restricted equations. The C 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of restrictions tested. In the 
case of 2SLS, the Mean Squared Error (MSE) (with no finite-sample 
adjustment) from the unrestricted (more efficient) equation is used to calculate 
both Sargan statistics. For further discussion, see Hayashi (2000: 218-22 and 
232-34). The test is of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments 
are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term and correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of the null hypothesis casts 
doubt on the validity of the instruments. Therefore when testing over-
identification, we wish to fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Although we have theoretically suggested there is self-selection as to who 
holds an asset at age 23/33, we test this using the Hausman Test. This 
procedure tests if the two- stage estimation produces significantly different 
results from an OLS estimation, which does not allow for self-selection, i.e. 
testing our assumption that the error term is correlated with the regressor. This 
validates the approach for treating asset-holding as a form of endogenous 
selection. The null hypothesis for this test states that an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates: that is, 
any endogeneity among the regressors would not have deleterious effects on 
OLS estimates and therefore as OLS is the more efficient estimator OLS should 
be used above the alternative model. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates that endogenous regressor effects on the estimates are meaningful, 
and an alternative modelling strategy is required.  
 
Rho also provides an estimate of the correlation between the error terms and its 
sign and statistical significance can provide a useful test of the validity of the 
selection model and the expected bias if selection is ignored. 
 
Finally, the F-test is a way of assessing if the explanatory power of a model 
(residual sum of squares) is sufficiently improved through the inclusion of 
additional explanatory variables. In the context of IV it can be used to test 
whether the instrument(s) effectively belong in the outcome equation in the 
sense that their inclusion sufficiently increases the explanatory power of the 
model.  
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5. Asset holding 
We begin by looking at asset-holding in our sample using the variable 
definitions we use in our statistical models. Table 3 shows the shares of men 
and women with financial assets at age 23 and 33 using the minimum cut-off 
defined in Section 2.1. The binary indicator variables for assets at age 23 and 
33 show the share of men and women with assets above the minimum cut-offs. 
The grouped asset variables group the sum of total financial assets valued in 
1981 prices.  
 
We find increases in the share of the cohort who hold assets above the 
minimum cut-offs between age 23 and age 33, small increases in the share with 
no savings or investments and falls in the share of men and women with low 
value financial assets. We also find increases in the share with larger assets 
(>£1,000) and large increases in the average value of assets (positive amounts) 
– nearly three times greater. 
 
Table 3: Shares of men and women with assets at age 23 and 33 (%/£) 
 
Men Women 
   Assets 23 (active) 47.8 45.1 
   Grouped assets 
  asset=0 25.5 26.8 
0>asset<£200 26.8 28.2 
£200>=asset<£1,000 25.8 26.1 
asset>=£1,000 21.9 18.8 
   Av value (£) if >0 1,579 1,325 
   Assets 33 (active) 57.3 47.28 
   Grouped assets 
  asset=0 26.6 30.3 
0>asset<£200 16.9 18.0 
£200>=asset<£1,000 18.7 19.0 
asset>=£1,000 37.8 32.8 
   Av value (£) if >0 6,282 5,211 
Note: Asset values in 1981 prices 
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As the estimation of the asset equation is critical to much of our analysis we 
begin by presenting some model estimates for this equation. We are seeking to 
find a set of variables that predict asset-holding at age 23/33 but do not directly 
impact on the outcome variables of interest (earnings, employment, general 
health, malaise): the exclusion restrictions. They can be thought of as the 
‘instruments’ (or linear combination) that will be used in the statistical 
modelling ,although we experiment with the precise selection of variables such 
as the exclusion of absence from school due to illness in the general health and 
malaise outcome models. A great deal of analysis was conducted before the 
final selection of variables. The underlying rationale was that the set of 
variables should provide a theoretical basis for separate identification of the 
asset equation and should pass identification tests and model diagnostics as 
outlined in Section 4.2.  
 
The results for the asset equation estimates can be found in Table 4. We find a 
social class gradient with individuals from more privileged social class 
backgrounds more likely to have an asset at age 23/33. Social class may not 
just influence individuals’ ability to accumulate or inherit an asset but may 
influence individuals’ attitudes to asset holding. Higher maths (arithmetic) tests 
scores at age 7 are associated with an increased probability of having an asset 
at age 23/33 (not statistically significant for women). Conversely the 
relationship between reading test scores at age 7 and the probability of having 
an asset at age 23/33 is stronger and more likely to be statistically significant 
for women.  
 
We were unable to find a general health question at age 16 so we used the 
variable which reported the amount of time absent from school in the last 12 
months. Being absent from school for over one month due to illness during the 
last 12 months at age 16 was associated with a lower probability of having an 
asset at age 23/33 (not statistically significant for asset-holding among men age 
33).  
 
We included two attitudinal questions which we thought would reflect attitudes 
towards accumulating and holding financial assets. At age 16 respondents were 
asked to respond to the statement ‘no point planning for the future’ and ‘never 
take work seriously’ We found a positive relationship between respondents 
who disagreed with the statement ‘no point planning for the future’ and the 
probability of holding an asset at age 33, relative to those who agreed with the 
statement. Respondents who agreed responded ‘true’ to the statement ‘never 
take work seriously’ were the least likely to be holding an asset at age 23/33.  
 
Parental financial problems when cohort member was age 11 were associated 
with a lower probability of having an asset at age 23, but this relationship was 
not statistically significant by age 33. Similarly being in receipt of Free School 
Meals (an indicator of low household income) at age 11 was associated with a 
lower probability of holding an asset at age 23/33 (not statistically significant 
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for women age 33). Relative to other forms of housing, owner occupation at 
age 7 was associated with a higher probability of holding an asset at age 23/33. 
The presence of siblings was associated with a lower probability of later asset 
holding; although more important for age 23 assets than age 33 assets.  
 
The presence of dependent children at age 23 was associated with a lower 
probability of asset holding and the effect was bigger the more children there 
were.  
 
Table 4: Coefficients estimates from the probit model of the probability of 
holding an active asset age 23 and age 33 
     Males 23   Females 23   Males 33   Females 33 
 
β β β  β  
Social class (birth) 
    Intermediate -0.030 -0.051 -0.230 -0.147 
Skilled N-Man -0.102 -0.183 -0.359 -0.279 
Skilled Man -0.162 -0.224 -0.401 -0.240 
Semi-skilled -0.241 -0.180 -0.369 -0.257 
Unskilled -0.457 -0.348 -0.544 -0.250 
missing -0.205 -0.143 -0.370 -0.245 
Maths test age 7 
    3rd quartile 0.077 0.040 0.119 0.065 
2nd quartile 0.168 0.077 0.284 0.057 
1st quartile 0.201 0.089 0.306 0.097 
missing 0.006 0.067 -0.146 0.227 
Reading test age 7 
    3rd quartile 0.098 0.073 0.075 0.202 
2nd quartile 0.086 0.190 0.117 0.191 
1st quartile 0.059 0.184 -0.070 0.220 
missing 0.225 0.040 0.416 -0.064 
School absence (illness) 16 
   1 wk - 1 mth 0.022 -0.135 -0.075 -0.085 
over 1 mth -0.159 -0.180 -0.073 -0.222 
absent dk length -0.260 -0.168 -0.342 -0.099 
does not attend -0.310 -0.911 -0.127 -0.226 
don’t know 0.038 -0.097 -0.147 0.095 
No point planning for future 16 
   cannot say 0.032 0.088 0.135 0.252 
not/not usually true 0.088 0.085 0.156 0.187 
missing 0.255 -0.019 0.254 0.193 
 
 
   
28 
 
     Males 23   Females 23   Males 33   Females 33 
 
β β β  β  
Never take work seriously 16 
usually true 0.248 0.265 0.286 0.134 
cannot say 0.358 0.281 0.331 0.005 
usually not true 0.333 0.276 0.335 0.216 
not true 0.380 0.374 0.349 0.274 
missing 0.136 0.404 0.216 0.133 
Parental financial problems 11 
   financial problems -0.188 -0.153 -0.078 -0.106 
missing -0.030 0.150 0.023 0.001 
Free school meals 11 
    yes -0.184 -0.321 -0.199 -0.016 
missing 0.102 -0.169 -0.068 -0.071 
Owner occupation 7 
    owner occupied 0.178 0.150 0.127 0.159 
missing -0.020 0.113 0.039 0.092 
Siblings 
    1 sibling -0.007 -0.094 -0.011 -0.077 
2 siblings -0.148 -0.144 0.043 -0.109 
3 siblings -0.295 -0.105 -0.176 -0.115 
4+ siblings -0.287 -0.227 -0.092 -0.189 
missing -0.236 -0.082 0.080 -0.258 
Dependent children age 23 
   1 child -0.363 -0.523 -0.230 -0.279 
2+ children -0.846 -0.747 -0.425 -0.502 
Months in FT work 16-23 
   less than 2yrs 0.043 0.262 -0.064 0.028 
over 2 < 5yrs 0.107 0.397 -0.254 -0.031 
5+ yrs 0.256 0.347 -0.388 -0.048 
incomplete record -0.022 0.181 -0.589 -0.381 
Months in FT work 23-33 
   none 
  
-0.942 -0.341 
less than 8yrs 
  
-0.589 -0.230 
incomplete record 
  
-0.377 -0.314 
constant -0.410 -0.447 0.442 0.201 
Notes: Probit model estimates. Reference categories: Professional social class, 1st quantile 
maths test 7, 1st quantile reading test 7, less than 1 week absence from school in year 16, ‘no 
point planning for the future’ very/usually true 16, ‘never take work seriously’ very true 16, 
no parental financial problems 11, no free school meals 11, not in owner occupation 7, no 
siblings, no dependent children 23, no months in FT work 16-23yrs, 8 years or more FT work 
23-33yrs. Coefficients that are statistically significant above the 5% level are highlighted in 
bold. 
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There is an interesting relationship between work histories and asset-holding. 
We initially included these variables because we felt that fuller work histories 
would be indicative of higher earnings and therefore income up to age 23 or 33 
and this would affect individuals’ ability to accumulate an asset. For men aged 
23 we found an increase in the probability of having an asset if they had 
worked full-time for 5 years or more (relative to those with no work 
experience). For women aged 23 we found that any full-time work experience 
between 16 and 23 was associated with a higher probability of having an asset 
at age 23 relative to those with no work experience. However by age 33 quite a 
different picture emerges. Full time work experience between ages 23 and 33 
was associated with a higher probability of having an asset and the longer the 
work experience the higher the probability of having an asset. Work experience 
16-23 years does not have a statistically significant effect on asset holding at 
age 33 for women, but for men it is those individuals who had no full-time 
work experience during these years who are more likely to have an asset at age 
33 and the longer work experience is the greater the negative relationship. This 
is likely to be picking up the fact that men with longer work experience are 
likely to have left education earlier with fewer qualifications and subsequently 
to have lower income and a reduced ability to accumulate an asset. 
 
6. Estimating the impact of assets on later adult outcomes  
Overall we have four different outcomes and a simple asset specification and a 
more complex asset specification where we look at different levels of assets-
holding. We examine assets at age 23 and age 33 and outcomes at age 33 and 
age 42. This amounts to a large number of estimations; for the sake of brevity 
we report only the coefficient of interest
13
. We provide model estimates for the 
simple binary asset model and for levels of assets (ordered model) and for more 
complex models which take into account selection and endogeneity related to 
asset-holding and contrast these findings with differences observed in raw 
means. The outcome equations contain a core set of independent control 
variables covering: social class background, ethnicity, educational attainment, 
marital status, presence of dependent children. Additional control variables are 
included where relevant to the specific outcome being estimated, such as job 
characteristics in the wage equation. The asset equations contain controls for 
social class background, presence of financial problems at age 11, free school 
meals at age 11, if parents were owner occupiers, ability test scores, attitudinal 
data, absence from school due to ill health, number of siblings, work 
experience, number of dependent children (see Section 4). These are the 
exclusion restrictions or (linear combination of) instruments. 
 
Table 5 shows the actual hourly gross wage at age 33 and age 42 by asset-
holding status at age 23 and 33. It is clear from the differences in the raw data 
                                              
13
  The full results are available from the author on request. 
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that individuals with assets earn, on average, more than individuals without 
assets. With one exception (men with assets at age 23 and wages at age 42), 
higher levels of assets are associated with higher average wages. 
 
A comparison between age 42 wages and asset-holding at age 23 and age 33 
shows that individuals with no assets at age 33 (or assets of low value) are 
relatively worse-off in terms of average wages than individuals in similar 
positions at age 23. This suggests, as you would expect, that some individuals 
with no/low level assets at age 23 improved their position over time. In terms 
of age 42 wages it appears, in the raw data at least, that ‘asset-poverty’ is 
associated with poorer wage outcomes when it occurs later in adult life. 
 
Table 5: Actual average gross wages and asset-holding (£) 
 
Age 23 assets 
 
Age 33 assets 
 
Age 33 
 
Age 42 
 
Age 42 
 
Wage 
 
Wage 
 
Wage 
Males 
     no ‘active’ asset 7.10 
 
11.51 
 
10.45 
asset 7.97 
 
13.57 
 
13.89 
Females 
     no ‘active’ asset 5.11 
 
7.95 
 
7.40 
asset 6.10 
 
8.91 
 
9.12 
Males 
     0 7.08 
 
12.02 
 
10.31 
0<£200 7.11 
 
11.23 
 
10.56 
£200<£1,000 7.78 
 
12.95 
 
12.04 
£1,000+ 8.20 
 
14.25 
 
14.93 
Females 
     0 4.87 
 
7.41 
 
7.13 
0<£200 5.29 
 
8.16 
 
7.82 
£200<£1,000 5.92 
 
8.78 
 
8.42 
£1,000+ 6.38 
 
9.09 
 
9.58 
Note: ‘active’ assets denote asset holdings above the minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. 
Assets are valued in 1981 prices. 
 
6.1 The impact of assets on earnings 
In this section we focus on estimates of the impact of holding assets at age 23 
on age 33 and age 42 hourly wages for men and women for all those in 
employment (due to data limitations we are not able to analyse the employment 
income of self-employed workers). We also look at the impact of asset-holding 
at age 33 on age 42 wages.  
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Table 6 contains the asset-effect estimates in the raw data, ordinary least 
squares regression, and the predicted marginal effects from the ‘treatment 
effect’ models.  In addition estimates are included from IV models. 
 
The results show positive differences in hourly wages of men and women at 
age 33 between those with and without assets at age 23: wage premiums of 5% 
for men and 7% for women at age 33 in the simple OLS models. In the raw 
data the wage premiums are 12% for men and 19%, so the OLS results suggest 
that over half of these differences are due to asset holders having other 
characteristics that predict higher wages (such as higher education, privileged 
social class background, etc). The predicted marginal effects from the treatment 
effects (TE) model suggests that the OLS estimates are biased upwards due to 
problems associated with endogeneity (see Methodology section) but remain 
positive and statistically significant: these results suggest an asset-effect on 
wages of 4% for men and 5% for women at age 33.  
 
When different levels of assets are identified it is found for men that assets 
under £200 (in 1981 prices) have no statistically significant effect on wages; 
supporting our decision to impose a minimum cut-off for the binary asset 
variable. Assets greater than £200 but less than £1,000 have a 3% effect on 
wages (but this result is only marginally significant) and a larger 7% effect for 
assets £1,000 or more, showing a positive relationship between assets levels 
and later wages. We don’t have the marginal effects estimates for the treatment 
effects models with grouped assets but it is clear from the coefficients that a 
similar pattern remains after controlling for endogeneity. However rho is not 
statistically significant which suggests that for this model the errors in the two 
models are not correlated and the OLS estimates are unbiased. 
 
For women, the OLS estimates show a positive gradient between wages at age 
33 and the value of assets held at age 23, with the effects on wages larger than 
those observed for men (a finding that is reflected in the raw data).  Relative to 
women with zero assets at age 23 the OLS estimates suggest that, on average, 
women who had assets up to £200 (in 1981) were earning 6% more at age 33, 
women with assets worth more than £200 but less than £1,000 were earnings 
10% more and women with assets worth more than £1,000 at age 23 were 
earning, on average, 11% more at age 33. While we don’t have comparative 
marginal effects for the TE model with asset levels the coefficient estimates 
show a significant positive gradient between the value of assets held at age 23 
and wages at age 33. The estimate of rho is statistically significant showing a 
correlation between the residuals in the asset selection equation and the wage 
equation.  
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Table 6: Asset effect wage estimates at age 33: raw, OLS, treatment effects 
and IV model estimates 
 Raw 
diff 
 OLS  TE  IV 
   β/ME  β ME rho  β/ME 
Males          
‘Active’ asset 23 0.123  0.053  0.280 0.042 -0.425  0.187 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Grouped 23          
0<£200 0.000  -0.011  -0.001  -0.166   
   (0.525)  (0.948)  (0.231)   
£200<£1,000 0.099  0.030  0.042     
   (0.096)  (0.040)     
£1,000+ 0.139  0.066  0.210     
   (0.000)  (0.086)     
Females          
‘Active’ asset 23 0.194  0.074  0.427 0.052 -0.624  0.429 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23          
0<£200 0.086  0.057  0.077  -0.431   
   (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.009)   
£200<£1,000 0.215  0.104  0.122     
   (0.000)  (0.000)     
£1,000+ 0.310  0.110  0.506     
   (0.000)  (0.001)     
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Model estimates statistically significant at the 5% 
level shown in bold. Assets are valued in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings 
above the minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. 
 
At age 42 (Table 7) assets held at age 23 still have a positive effect on wages. 
For men, we find a 6% wage premium in the simple OLS regression, the effect 
for women is not statistically significant. The wage premium for men with 
assets is reduced to 3% when endogeneity is taken into account in the treatment 
effects model. Looking at the different levels of assets in the OLS model we 
find that for men it is assets valued at £1,000 or more (in 1981) that have a 5% 
effect on wages but this is only marginally significant at the 7% level. The TE 
model estimates are not statistically significant, nor is rho. For women, we find 
statistically significant wage effects at the three levels of assets identified, 
although assets at least as great as £1,000 (in 1981) is only marginally 
significant at the 9% level. The positive and significant wage premium for 
women with assets less than £200 of 7% is likely to explain why the binary 
variable which has a minimum cut-off is not statistically significant. This is the 
33 
 
same as the age 42 wage premium for women with assets worth £200 or more 
but less than £1,000 at age 23. While marginal effect estimates are not 
available, coefficient estimates from the TE model show a significant and 
positive relationship between the value of assets held at age 23 and wages at 
age 42. Rho is insignificant which suggests that the OLS estimates are 
unbiased. 
 
Assets at age 33 have strong positive effects on wages at age 42, ceteris 
paribus. This can be seen in the OLS and treatment effects models. For men, 
we find a 33% premium in the raw data, this is reduced to 10% in the OLS 
model and to 8% in the TE model. The asset effect is very similar for women: 
23% in the raw data, 10% in the OLS model and 8% in the TE model. In the 
models that distinguish between different levels of assets, for men it is assets 
greater than £1,000 at age 33 (in 1981 prices) that have a statistically 
significant effect on wages at age 42: 45% premium in the raw data, 16% in the 
OLS model and although we don’t have marginal effects for the TE model the 
coefficient is large, positive and significant. Rho is significant. For women, the 
wage effects are higher and there exists a clear positive gradient with higher 
assets held at age 33 associated with higher relative wages at age 42. 
 
The instrumental variable model estimates show a much higher (in fact 
implausibly high) asset-effect on wages than that observed in the raw data. 
However, although tests of the model estimates using the Durbin (score) and 
Wu-Hausman suggest that the asset variable is endogenous in the wage 
equation, and tests of the overidentifying restrictions using the Sargan (score) 
and Basmann test statistics suggest that the instruments are valid, the model F-
test suggests that the instruments are weak. This is likely to explain the inflated 
coefficient in the IV models. We conducted a considerable amount of work 
searching for better instruments. While there are similarities between the IV 
and TE models theoretically the TE model fits better than the IV model and 
therefore our preferred model is the TE model. 
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Table 7: Asset effect wage estimates at age 42: raw, OLS, treatment effects 
and IV model estimates 
 Raw  OLS  TE  IV 
 diff  β/ME  β ME rho  β/ME 
Males          
‘Active’ asset 23 0.179  0.061  0.726 0.032 -0.686  0.187 
   (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.047) 
‘Active’ asset 33 0.329  0.103  0.817 0.078 -0.715  0.519 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Grouped 23          
0<£200 -0.066  -0.031  -0.022  -0.102   
   (0.284)  (0.478)  (0.386)   
£200<£1,000 0.077  0.031  0.043     
   (0.282)  (0.177)     
£1,000+ 0.186  0.054  0.199     
   (0.074)  (0.236)     
Grouped 33          
0<£200 0.024  0.002  -0.075  -0.735   
   (0.937)  (0.025)  (0.000)   
£200<£1,000 0.168  0.040  0.015     
   (0.172)  (0.650)     
£1,000+ 0.448  0.156  1.280     
   (0.000)  (0.000)     
          
Females          
‘Active’ asset 23 0.121  0.022  0.656 -0.012 -0.725  0.291 
   (0.226)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
‘Active’ asset 33 0.232  0.097  0.643 0.076 -0.644  0.625 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23          
0<£200 0.101  0.068  0.059  -0.024   
   (0.005)  (0.030)  (0.182)   
£200<£1,000 0.185  0.074  0.115     
   (0.004)  (0.000)     
£1,000+ 0.227  0.046  0.121     
   (0.091)  (0.000)     
Grouped 33          
0<£200 0.097  0.062  -0.055  -0.771   
   (0.017)  (0.062)  (0.000)   
£200<£1,000 0.181  0.117  0.061     
   (0.000)  (0.030)     
£1,000+ 0.344  0.126  1.206     
   (0.000)  (0.000)     
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Model estimates statistically significant at the 5% 
level shown in bold. Assets are valued in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings 
above the minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. 
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6.2 The impact of assets on employment probabilities 
 
The relationship between assets and employment status observed in the raw 
data shows a correlation between asset holding at age 23 and employment 
outcomes at age 33 and 42, and asset holding at age 33 and employment 
outcomes at age 42. Table 8 shows the distribution of employment status at age 
33 and 42 for asset and non-asset holders at age 23 and 33, separately for men 
and women.  
 
A higher proportion of men with active assets at age 23 are observed in full 
time employment or self-employment at age 33 and 42, compared with men 
without assets at age 23. A lower proportion of men with assets are 
unemployed or out of the labour force than men without assets. An interesting 
picture emerges from the analysis of assets by grouped asset values. In general 
self-employment is more common among men with either zero active assets at 
age 23 or with assets over £1,000 in value than for men with assets between 
these two values (the one exception being that a very slightly higher proportion 
of men without active assets at age 33 are self-employed at age 42 than men 
with assets greater than or equal to £200 and less than £1,000). The 
consequence of which is that while there is a clear positive gradient between 
the value of assets held and later proportions in full time employment up to 
asset holdings of £1,000, it tends to fall slightly after £1,000. It is possible that 
this finding illustrates two types of self-employment: (1) own account workers 
for those with low skills and poor employment prospects, (2) highly successful 
businesses. It is also possible that the lack of assets among this group is due to 
the fact that their financial assets have been invested in a business enterprise.  
 
Mirroring the positive relationship between asset holding and later employment 
probabilities, lower proportions of men with assets at age 23 and 33 are out of 
the labour force (OLF) or unemployed at age 33 or 42. The results from the 
analysis of grouped assets show a clear gradient: the higher the value of the 
asset held (age 23 and 33) the lower the proportion found OLF or unemployed 
(age 33 and 42). 
 
For women, the picture is more mixed. Women are more likely than men to be 
working part time and out of the labour force at age 33 and 42, and lower 
shares in full-time and self-employment. Holding assets at age 23 is associated 
with higher proportions in full time employment and lower proportions in 
unemployment or out of the labour force at age 33; there is no significant 
difference in the proportion of women working part time or in self-employment 
between women with and without assets. The positive relationship between 
assets at age 23 and full time employment at age 42 does not hold. Instead a 
higher proportion of women with assets at age 23 are employed part-time or are 
self-employed at age 42 than those without asset at age 23 and fewer of these 
women are out of the labour force. A similar relationship exists between asset 
holding at age 33 and outcomes at age 42. The analysis of assets by grouped 
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asset values and employment outcomes shows a positive gradient between asset 
values at age 23 and the proportion of women in full time employment at age 
33. There is a negative gradient between the value of assets held at age 23 and 
unemployment at age 33. Unlike for men, there is not a clear negative gradient 
between asset values and the proportion of women out of the labour force at 
age 33. The much higher proportions of women OLF is due to childcare 
responsibilities and the bipolar distribution (with higher shares of women OLF 
either with no assets at age 23 or assets of £1,000+) is likely to be an 
illustration of the contrasting position of women with limited employment 
prospects and those who were able to choose to stay at home full-time with 
their children. However, this relationship is not evident between asset holding 
at age 23 and OLF status at age 42. The much lower proportions of women 
OLF at age 42 is likely to be due to the fact many of these women returned to 
work after taking some time out of the labour force to raise children (This 
cohort was born in 1958 when average age of family formation was younger 
than it is today). 
 
In Table 9 we show the results when the employment outcome information is 
summarised into a simple binary categorisation where the proportions of 
individuals working either in full-time, part-time or self-employed are summed. 
This is the variable we shall use for the statistical modelling exercise.  
 
This summary information shows the overall positive relationship between 
asset holding at age 23 and employment at age 33 and 42, with a stronger 
relationship observed for men than for women. Looking at the value of the 
asset held at age 23 and 33 for men there is a clear positive gradient between 
assets and employment probabilities. For women, there are similar findings to 
those noted in the more detailed breakdown of employment status. 
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Table 8: The relationship between asset-holding and employment outcomes (%) 
Males 
  
Females 
  
Males 
 
Asset value 
 
Females Asset value 
 Age 23 assets no asset asset 
 
no asset asset 
 
0 0<£200 £200<£1000 £1000+ 
 
0 0<£200 £200<£1000 £1000+ 
Age 33 
               Full time 70.5 78.1 
 
31.5 34.6 
 
65.6 74.4 78.6 77.6 
 
29.1 33.3 34.4 35.0 
Part time  0.9 0.5 
 
29.3 29.0 
 
0.9 0.9 0.7 0.4 
 
28.3 30.3 31.3 25.7 
Self employed 15.7 16.9 
 
6.8 7.0 
 
17.7 14.0 15.6 18.3 
 
6.2 7.2 5.8 8.7 
Unemployed 8.5 2.8 
 
2.7 1.2 
 
9.4 7.8 3.4 2.1 
 
3.3 2.2 1.2 1.1 
OLF 3.4 1.2 
 
28.3 26.8 
 
5.0 2.0 1.3 1.1 
 
31.9 25.3 25.9 28.1 
Other 1.1 0.5 
 
1.5 1.4 
 
1.4 0.9 0.5 0.6 
 
1.3 1.7 1.3 1.4 
Age 42 
               Full time 68.8 74.7 
 
41.5 40.1 
 
63.2 73.2 75.9 73.5 
 
39.2 43.3 40.1 40.1 
Part time  1.8 1.1 
 
29.8 34.7 
 
1.9 1.9 1.0 1.3 
 
26.9 30.2 35.1 34.3 
Self employed 17.4 18.7 
 
6.8 8.7 
 
19.2 16.1 17.1 20.5 
 
6.6 7.0 8.0 9.7 
Unemployed 3.8 1.9 
 
1.9 1.0 
 
4.6 3.1 2.4 1.4 
 
2.2 1.7 1.4 0.6 
OLF 7.3 3.0 
 
19.4 13.7 
 
9.8 5.2 3.2 2.7 
 
23.5 16.1 13.8 13.7 
Other 1.0 0.6 
 
1.6 1.8 
 
1.3 0.8 0.5 0.6 
 
1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Age 33 assets 
               Age 42 
               Full time 69.5 75.2 
 
39.4 41.2 
 
66.9 74.0 77.2 74.2 
 
36.9 43.4 43.2 40.2 
Part time  1.7 1.1 
 
30.4 33.2 
 
2.0 1.3 1.5 0.9 
 
30.3 30.6 36.0 31.6 
Self employed 15.7 18.9 
 
6.8 8.1 
 
16.2 14.8 17.0 20.0 
 
7.1 6.1 6.0 9.4 
Unemployed 4.5 1.4 
 
2.3 0.9 
 
5.1 3.7 1.1 1.6 
 
2.6 1.8 0.8 0.9 
OLF 7.8 2.4 
 
19.5 14.6 
 
9.0 5.7 2.6 2.4 
 
21.3 16.6 12.5 15.7 
Other 0.7 0.9 
 
1.7 2.0 
 
0.8 0.6 0.7 1.0 
 
1.9 1.6 1.5 2.2 
Note: ‘No asset’/’asset’ refers to assets below and above the minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. All assets valued in 1981 prices. 
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Table 9: Employment (full-time, part-time and self-employment): percent 
within asset group 
 
Age 23 assets 
 
Age 33 assets 
 
Age 33 
 
Age 42 
 
Age 42 
 
Emp 
 
Emp 
 
Emp 
Males 
     no ‘active’ asset 87.0 
 
88.0 
 
87.0 
asset 95.5 
 
94.6 
 
95.3 
      Females 
     no ‘active’ asset 67.6 
 
78.0 
 
76.6 
asset 70.7 
 
83.5 
 
82.6 
      Males 
     0 84.2 
 
84.4 
 
85.1 
0<£200 89.3 
 
90.9 
 
90.0 
£200<£1000 94.9 
 
94.0 
 
95.6 
£1000+ 96.2 
 
95.3 
 
95.1 
      Females 
     0 63.6 
 
72.6 
 
74.3 
0<£200 70.8 
 
80.5 
 
80.1 
£200<£1000 71.6 
 
83.1 
 
85.2 
£1000+ 69.4 
 
84.0 
 
81.2 
Note: no ‘active’ assets denote asset holdings below the minimum cut-offs defined in Section 
3. Assets are valued in 1981 prices. 
 
MODELLING THE IMPACT OF ASSET-HOLDINGS ON EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITIES 
Modelling the potential impact of assets on the probability of being in 
employment raises some statistical challenges because the outcome variable is 
binary (or possibly multinomial). This means that standard instrumental 
variable models cannot be estimated and it is necessary to program maximum 
likelihood models to estimate treatment effects models. To estimate the impact 
of asset holding on employment probabilities we estimate simple probit models 
where we ignore the potential endogeneity of the asset variable. Then to 
address the endogeneity issue we estimate treatment effects models (bivariate 
probit models; where the joint distribution is estimated). 
 
Most of the control variables we use and the variables used to identify the asset 
model are the same as those used in the earnings models in Section 6.1. The 
exceptions are that in the employment equation we exclude variables relating to 
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the type of employment which were important in estimating the level of 
earnings but are inappropriate in the model of employment probability (sector 
of employment, full/part-time employment). 
 
The estimates from the statistical models for the probability of being in work at 
age 33 are in Table 10 and age 42 in Table 11. The results from the simple 
probit models suggest that overall asset holding at age 23 has a positive effect 
(association) with employment at age 33 for men. The marginal effect 
(evaluated at sample means) suggest that this amounts to a 5% increase in the 
probability of working for men with similar education, family circumstances, 
ethnicity and social class background characteristics. The can be interpreted as 
follows: if the probability of being in employment at age 33 was 87% for 
individuals without an asset (as for men in Table 9) the positive effect of the 
asset would, on average, increase this probability to 91%. The positive 
relationship between assets and employment outcomes increases with the size 
of the asset held. 
 
For women, overall we do not find a statistically significant asset effect, but the 
more detailed breakdown of asset levels reveals that compared with women 
with no assets at age 23, women with assets up to £200 and between £200 and 
£1,000 have a 5-6% increased probability of working at age 33. Reflecting the 
findings in the raw data, women with higher value assets (>£1,000 in 1981) are 
no more likely to be in employment at age 33 than women with no assets. 
 
Estimates from the treatment effects model for the binary model of assets 
suggests a significant positive effect for men. Rho is an estimate of the 
correlation between the residuals in the two equations (assets, employment). 
Here rho is negative and statistically significant which suggests that there is a 
variable not included in the model that increases the probability of holding an 
asset but reduced the probability of being in employment. It suggests that the 
probit model estimates will be biased downwards. The marginal effect estimate 
suggests an asset-effect of 27% which looks high and may indicate problems 
with the model specification. The effect for women is not statistically 
significant.  
 
The treatment effects model estimates where different levels of assets at age 23 
are identified shows that once potential endogeneity in the asset variable is 
explicitly modelled there are no significant differences between women with no 
assets and women with the three levels of assets identified, in terms of their 
employment probability at age 33. Rho is negative and statistically insignificant 
which suggests that the probit model underestimates the true asset-effect. For 
men higher levels of assets are found to have a positive effect on the 
probability of being in employment at age 33. 
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Table 10: Asset effect employment estimates age 33: Raw, probit and 
treatment effects model estimates 
 Raw 
diff 
 probit  TE 
   β ME  β ME rho 
Males         
‘Active’ asset 23 0.098  0.406 0.051  1.486 0.271 -0.696 
   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 0.061  0.135 0.016  0.660  -0.677 
   (0.057)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
£200<£1,000 0.127  0.439 0.047  1.132   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ 0.143  0.524 0.057  2.057   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Females         
‘Active’ asset 23 0.046  0.012 0.004  0.131 0.046 -0.074 
   (0.760)   (0.730)  (0.682) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 0.113  0.168 0.057  0.146  0.021 
   (0.001)   (0.396)  (0.895) 
£200<£1,000 0.125  0.146 0.050  0.108   
   (0.008)   (0.707)   
£1,000+ 0.091  0.059 0.021  0.002   
   (0.326)   (0.997)   
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Marginal effects (ME) are evaluated at sample 
means. Assets are valued in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings above the 
minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. 
 
We also find significant positive effects of assets held at age 23 and 33 on 
employment probabilities at age 42 (Table 11). The treatment effects model 
estimates are positive and significant. However the marginal effects estimates 
seem implausibly high for women, age 23 and age 33 assets, and for men with 
assets at age 33 and further analysis of these results is warranted. These asset 
effects are generally greater for higher asset values. Rho is negative and 
statistically insignificant which suggests that the probit model estimates 
underestimate the true asset-effect 
 
For men, the treatment effect model estimates show that the relationship 
between assets held at age 33 and employment at age 42 is greater than that 
between assets held at age 23 and employment at age 42, in the raw data and in 
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the three models estimated. This is not the case for women in the simple probit 
model estimates. Overall there appears to be a clear gradient between the level 
of assets held and later employment probabilities that is stronger for men. 
Although for assets greater than £1,000 at age 33 are not associated with the 
highest asset-effect. 
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Table 11: Asset effect employment estimates age 42: Raw, probit and 
treatment effects model estimates 
 Raw  probit  TE 
 diff  β ME  β ME rho 
Males         
‘Active’ asset 23 0.075  0.203 0.025  0.921 0.138 -0.459 
   (0.001)   (0.041)  (0.039) 
‘Active’ asset 33 0.095  0.319 0.039  1.505 0.306 -0.724 
   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 0.078  0.217 0.025  0.440  -0.242 
   (0.003)   (0.021)  (0.245) 
£200<£1,000 0.114  0.292 0.033  0.678   
   (0.000)   (0.033)   
£1,000+ 0.129  0.346 0.037  0.973   
   (0.000)   (0.063)   
Grouped 33         
0<£200 0.058  0.108 0.012  0.509  -0.577 
   (0.186)   (0.000)  (0.004) 
£200<£1,000 0.124  0.438 0.042  1.031   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ 0.117  0.317 0.035  1.491   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   
         
Females         
‘Active’ asset 23 0.069  0.106 0.029  1.276 0.371 -0.747 
   (0.017)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
‘Active’ asset 33 0.079  0.078 0.021  1.528 0.489 -0.908 
   (0.075)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 0.108  0.162 0.043  0.606  -0.485 
   (0.004)   (0.000)  (0.001) 
£200<£1,000 0.145  0.196 0.051  0.978   
   (0.001)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ 0.156  0.217 0.056  1.464   
   (0.001)   (0.000)   
Grouped 33         
0<£200 0.078  0.156 0.041  0.578  -0.589 
   (0.011)   (0.000)  (0.001) 
£200<£1,000 0.148  0.276 0.070  0.944   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ 0.093  0.063 0.017  1.289   
   (0.253)   (0.000)   
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Marginal effects (ME) are evaluated at sample 
means. Assets are valued in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings above the 
minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. 
 
 
43 
 
6.3 General health and asset holding 
Assets may also have an impact on general health through allowing an 
individual to pursue a healthier lifestyle in terms living environment, diet 
(although more likely to be linked to income), access to sports facilities, 
holidays and medical services, etc., and the extent to which a sense of well-
being associated with a more favourable asset position influences self-reported 
general health. In this section we examine the relationship between asset 
holding and individuals’ self-reported general health. NCDS respondents were 
asked at age 33 and 42 about their general health. ‘How would you describe 
your health generally? Would you say it is: excellent, good, fair or poor?’ We 
have chosen to focus on the probability of respondents reporting excellent 
general health. In the raw statistics shown in Table 12 it is clear to see that asset 
holding is always associated with a greater probability of reporting excellent 
general health relative to the lack of assets. In addition, higher assets are almost 
always associated with higher probabilities of reporting excellent general 
health. 
 
Table 12: Self-reported ‘excellent’ general health: percent within asset 
groups 
 
Age 23 assets 
 
Age 33 assets 
 
Age 33 
 
Age 42 
 
Age 42 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Males 
     no ‘active’ asset 34.0 
 
27.4 
 
26.3 
asset 39.2 
 
34.3 
 
34.3 
      Females 
     no ‘active’ asset 28.4 
 
25.0 
 
25.1 
asset 38.8 
 
35.0 
 
34.0 
      Males 
     0 34.9 
 
27.2 
 
25.4 
0<£200 33.1 
 
27.8 
 
28.6 
£200<£1000 36.6 
 
31.6 
 
28.9 
£1000+ 42.4 
 
37.3 
 
36.7 
      Females 
     0 26.9 
 
23.8 
 
23.8 
0<£200 29.4 
 
26.1 
 
27.0 
£200<£1000 35.5 
 
34.0 
 
31.4 
£1000+ 43.5 
 
36.3 
 
35.7 
Notes: no ‘active’ assets denote asset holdings below the minimum cut-offs defined in 
Section 3. Assets are valued in 1981 prices. 
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As with earnings and employment it is certainly possible that what looks like a 
relative advantage among asset-holders could be due to other individual 
characteristics that both increase the likelihood that an individual is holding an 
asset at age 23 or age 33 and the probability of reporting excellent general 
health. To try and isolate the asset-effect, as above, we employ a number of 
modelling strategies.  
 
Modelling the probability of reporting excellent general health at 33 or 42 
using a probit specification allows us to control for a range of variables that 
may directly affect general health and which are also correlated with asset 
holding. Table 13 shows the results from this model for general health at age 
33.  
 
The probit model and the treatment effects model estimates suggest that for 
men, when other characteristics have been controlled for, asset-holding at age 
23 is weakly associated with an increase in self-reported excellent general 
health at age 33 of 2.4%; this is only significant at the 10% level (Table 13). 
The results from the treatment effects model which takes into account 
endogenous selection, while greater than the probit model estimates, are also 
only weakly significant (at the 7% level). Rho (ρ) measures the correlation 
between the residuals in the two equations (asset-holding, excellent general 
health). The negative sign of rho suggests that there is a variable not included 
in the model that increases the probability of asset-holding and reduces the 
probability of excellent general health. This leads to a downward bias in the 
simple probit equation. Assuming that the marginal effect from the TE model is 
significant, this can be interpreted as: if the probability of excellent general 
health was 34% (as in the raw data for this group, see Table 12) at age 33 
among those without assets at age 23 this would increase to 41% should these 
individuals have had assets at age 23, holding everything else constant. The 
results for women can be interpreted in a similar way. The marginal effect of 
asset-holding are higher (as in the raw data) for women than men. Results from 
the treatment effects model suggest that asset-holding at age 23 increases 
excellent general health by 27%.  
 
When we examine the different levels of assets we see find no statistically 
significant effects for men at the 5% level of significance. Assets £1,000 or 
more at age 23 are significant only at the 10% level for men – 21% higher than 
no assets in the raw data, 3.7% higher in the simple probit model. The 
estimated effects from the TE model are not statistically significant. For 
women assets over £200 are associated with higher excellent general health in 
the raw data, the simple probit model and the treatment effects model. The sign 
and significance of rho indicates that the probit model estimates are biased 
towards zero. 
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Overall at age 33 there is little evidence of an asset-effect on self-reported 
excellent general health for men in contrast to a positive asset-effect for 
women. 
 
Table 13: Asset effect general health (excellent) estimates age 33: Raw, 
probit and treatment effects model estimates 
 raw  probit  TE 
 diff  β ME  β ME rho 
Males         
‘Active’ asset 23 0.153  0.064 0.024  0.591 0.220 -0.335 
   (0.099)   (0.071)  (0.045) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 -0.052  -0.064 -0.024  0.138  -0.207 
   (0.247)   (0.413)  (0.209) 
£200<£1,000 0.048  -0.019 -0.007  0.328   
   (0.732)   (0.236)   
£1,000+ 0.214  0.097 0.037  0.643   
   (0.092)   (0.132)   
Females         
‘Active’ asset 23 0.365  0.166 0.060  0.744 0.268 -0.366 
   (0.000)   (0.008)  (0.023) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 0.092  0.014 0.005  0.349  -0.329 
   (0.800)   (0.033)  (0.040) 
£200<£1,000 0.318  0.112 0.041  0.688   
   (0.043)   (0.010)   
£1,000+ 0.614  0.276 0.103  1.157   
   (0.002)   (0.004)   
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Marginal effects (ME) are evaluated at sample 
means. Assets are valued in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings above the 
minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. 
 
Interestingly by age 42 we find that holding an asset at age 23 does have a 
positive effect on men reporting excellent general health (around 4%) in the 
simple probit model (see Table 14) and a similar effect between asset holding 
at age 33 and general health at age 42. However, the treatment effects model 
results suggest that there are no statistically significant effects and the estimates 
of rho suggest that there is not a statistically significant correlation in the 
residuals of the two equations (asset holding, excellent general health). This 
suggests that the simple probit model estimates are unbiased. This is in contrast 
to the results for women where we find positive and statistically significant 
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asset effects on general health at age 42 in relation to assets held at age 23 and 
age 33. 40% in the raw data, 6% in the simple probit model and 20% in the 
treatment effects model for age 23 assets and 36%, 5% and 33% respectively 
for age 33 assets. 
 
The results from the grouped asset models show that for men assets below 
£1,000 (in 1981 prices) do not have a statistically significant effect on self-
reported excellent general health. Assets over £1,000 have a positive and 
statistically significant effect (around 6%). For women, assets over £200 have a 
positive and statistically significant effect and the effects are larger for those 
with over £1,000. Even assets up to £200 (in 1981 prices) at age 23 and 33 
have positive and significant effects on women’s self-reported excellent general 
health at age 42 in the treatment effects models. 
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Table 14: Asset effect general health (excellent) estimates age 42: Raw, 
probit and treatment effects model estimates 
 raw  probit  TE 
   β ME  β ME rho 
Males         
‘Active’ asset 23 0.249  0.105 0.037  0.332 0.116 -0.144 
   (0.010)   (0.273)  (0.345) 
‘Active’ asset 33 0.305  0.116 0.041  0.463 0.158 -0.221 
   (0.005)   (0.314)  (0.280) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 0.022  -0.008 -0.003  0.089  -0.099 
   (0.895)   (0.556)  (0.488) 
£200<£1,000 0.163  0.043 0.015  0.210   
   (0.458)   (0.396)   
£1,000+ 0.373  0.160 0.057  0.424   
   (0.007)   (0.269)   
Grouped 33         
0<£200 0.127  0.046 0.017  0.260  -0.250 
   (0.451)   (0.134)  (0.194) 
£200<£1,000 0.140  0.024 0.009  0.355   
   (0.691)   (0.168)   
£1,000+ 0.445  0.170 0.060  0.732   
   (0.001)   (0.080)   
         
Females         
‘Active’ assets 23 0.400  0.166 0.057  0.572 0.197 -0.256 
   (0.000)   (0.022)  (0.079) 
‘Active’ asset 33 0.358  0.139 0.048  0.991 0.332 -0.545 
   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 0.095  -0.007 -0.002  0.272  -0.271 
   (0.898)   (0.073)  (0.054) 
£200<£1,000 0.427  0.152 0.053  0.629   
   (0.007)   (0.010)   
£1,000+ 0.527  0.169 0.059  0.907   
   (0.006)   (0.014)   
Grouped 33         
0<£200 0.135  0.061 0.021  0.397  -0.389 
   (0.297)   (0.001)  (0.003) 
£200<£1,000 0.320  0.142 0.050  0.658   
   (0.013)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ 0.500  0.185 0.064  1.040   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Model estimates statistically significant at the 5% 
level shown in bold. Marginal effects (ME) are evaluated at sample means. Assets are valued 
in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings above the minimum cut-offs defined in 
Section 3. 
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6.4 The relationship between Malaise and asset holding 
The Malaise Inventory (Rutter et al, 1970), as explained in Section 4 above, is a 
set of self-completion questions asked at various ages in the NCDS (age 23, 33 
and 42). These questions combine to measure levels of psychological distress, 
or depression. There are 24 questions to which the respondent is required to 
answer ‘yes-no’ (Appendix C). The inventory covers emotional disturbance 
and associated physical symptoms. By simply summing the ‘yes’ answers 
(where yes=1 and no=0) the total scores range from 0 to 24. Individuals 
responding ‘yes’ to eight or more of the 24 items are considered to be at risk of 
depression (Rodgers et al., 1999); here we shall simply refer to this as Malaise. 
A considerable amount of validation has been undertaken and it is now widely 
used in social and medical sciences (Rodgers et al., 1999). 
 
The raw correlations between Malaise and asset holdings shown in Table 15 
show that a lower proportion of men and women who held an asset at age 23 
reported Malaise age 33 or 42 compared to those without assets. At age 33 the 
proportion reporting Malaise was around half for those with an asset at age 23. 
Similarly asset holding at age 33 was associated with a lower proportion of 
men and women reporting Malaise at age 42 compared with those without 
assets. When we look at the size of the asset held, Malaise declines 
monotonically, across the four asset groups considered, as the size of the asset 
held increases. 
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Table 15: Malaise (8-24): percent within asset group 
  
Age 23 assets 
 
Age 33 assets 
  
Age 33 
 
Age 42 
 
Age 42 
  
Malaise 
 
Malaise 
 
Malaise 
Males 
      no ‘active’ asset 6.2 
 
12.3 
 
12.0 
‘active’ asset 
 
2.8 
 
7.8 
 
8.1 
       Females 
      no ‘active’ asset 11.6 
 
18.3 
 
19.2 
‘active’ asset 
 
5.5 
 
11.6 
 
11.7 
       Males 
      0 
 
7.3 
 
14.9 
 
13.4 
0<£200 
 
5.3 
 
10.1 
 
10.4 
£200<£1000 2.9 
 
7.9 
 
9.2 
£1000+ 
 
2.6 
 
7.7 
 
7.4 
       Females 
      0 
 
13.5 
 
21.5 
 
20.9 
0<£200 
 
10.0 
 
15.8 
 
17.3 
£200<£1000 6.1 
 
12.6 
 
12.2 
£1000+ 
 
4.6 
 
10.3 
 
10.9 
Notes: ‘active’ assets denote asset holdings above the minimum cut-offs defined in Section 3. 
Assets are valued in 1981 prices. 
 
The regression results shown in Table 16 show that the negative association 
between asset-holding and Malaise (individuals with assets are less likely to 
suffer from Malaise) at age 33 remains after a range of control variables have 
been included in a simple probit regression modelling the probability of 
reporting Malaise at age 33. The results from the grouped asset values supports 
our decision to exclude small levels of assets from our binary asset variable as 
assets less than £200 have no significant effect on Malaise. The marginal effect 
estimates from the simple probits (evaluated at sample means) suggest that 
overall assets are associated with 1.4% lower probability of reported Malaise 
for men and 1.7% for women. The treatment effect model estimates are not 
statistically significant for men (nor is rho) but is for women. The estimate for 
women suggests that asset-holding at 23 reduces the probability of Malaise by 
23%. Rho, which measures the correlation between the residuals in the two 
equations (asset-holding, Malaise), is positive and significant, which suggests 
that there is a variable not included in the model that is positively related to 
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asset-holding and Malaise. This leads to a bias towards zero in the probit 
coefficient estimate and therefore leads to an underestimate of the negative 
effect of asset-holding on Malaise. 
 
Table 16: Asset effect Malaise (8-24) estimates age 33: Raw, probit and 
treatment effects model estimates 
 Raw  probit  TE 
   β ME  β ME rho 
Males         
‘Active’ asset 23 -0.553  -0.200 -0.014  -0.393 -0.028 0.122 
   (0.008)   (0.352)  (0.646) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 -0.276  -0.091 -0.006  -0.214  0.128 
   (0.317)   (0.384)  (0.590) 
£200<£1,000 -0.600  -0.240 -0.015  -0.453   
   (0.019)   (0.256)   
£1,000+ -0.640  -0.260 -0.016  -0.600   
   (0.020)   (0.347)   
Females         
‘Active’ asset 23 -0.527  -0.132 -0.017  -1.308 -0.231 0.918 
   (0.028)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 -0.257  -0.055 -0.007  -0.591  0.606 
   (0.429)   (0.000)  (0.004) 
£200<£1,000 -0.550  -0.152 -0.018  -1.084   
   (0.057)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ -0.656  -0.182 -0.021  -1.700   
   (0.053)   (0.000)   
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Model estimates statistically significant at the 5% 
level shown in bold. Marginal effects (ME) are evaluated at sample means. Assets are valued 
in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings above the minimum cut-offs defined in 
Section 3. 
 
For women, higher asset values at age 23 are associated with lower 
probabilities of reported Malaise at age 33. Assets with a value less than £200 
(in 1981) have no statistically significant effect on Malaise at age 33.  
 
The treatment effects model estimates suggest that when endogeneity is taken 
into account, the level of asset-holding is not statistically significantly related 
to variation in Malaise at age 33 for men. In contrast, a clear significant 
negative gradient is evident for women (higher levels of assets are associated 
with lower probabilities of Malaise). In the treatment effects model rho is 
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insignificant for men but positive and significant in the model estimate for 
women. 
 
The relationship between asset holding at age 23 and Malaise age 42 is lower in 
the raw data for men but the marginal effect estimates from the simple probit 
model and the treatment effects model show larger statistically significant 
effects (Table 17). The estimate of rho is positive and statistically significant 
demonstrating a positive correlation between the residuals in the two equations 
(asset-holding, Malaise). For women, the simple probit model estimates a non-
significant relationship between asset holding and Malaise but the treatment 
effects model estimate shows a strong significant negative effect. 
 
For men the results from the grouped asset variable show some variation 
between the size of the asset held at age 23 and Malaise at age 42 although it is 
not monotonic. Despite higher recorded levels of Malaise among women and 
higher Malaise at age 42 compared with age 33, asset holding at age 23 is not 
associated with lower Malaise at age 42 in the simple probit model at any of the 
asset levels. However, the treatment effects model estimates which correct for 
endogeneity show a significant negative influence of assets on Malaise and a 
clear gradient with higher levels of assets leading to greater reductions in the 
probability of Malaise at age 42. The model estimate of rho is positive and 
significant. 
 
The relationship between asset holding at age 33 and Malaise at age 42 is not 
significant for men in the probit model but the treatment effects model 
estimates a negative relationship between assets and Malaise. The marginal 
effect is estimated to be a reduction of 17%. This can be interpreted as follows: 
if the probability of Malaise at 42 among men without an asset is 12% (as in 
Table 15) an asset at age 33, above the minimum cut-off, would, on average, 
reduce this probability to 10%. There is also a statistically significant negative 
effect of assets at age 33 on Malaise at age 42 for women in the treatment 
effects model but not in the simple probit model. For women the effect is 
greater with a marginal effect estimate of 32%. 
 
There is no statistically significance effect of assets on Malaise at age 42 for 
the different levels of assets at age 33 for men in the simple probit model 
estimates but the treatment effect model estimates a significant negative 
gradient, with high levels of assets having a stronger negative influence on 
Malaise. For women, the simple probit model estimates a negative effect of 
assets over £200 (in 1981 prices) at age 33. The treatment effect model 
estimates a statistically significant negative relationship between asset levels 
and Malaise. 
 
 
  
52 
 
Table 17: Asset effect Malaise (8-24) estimates age 42: Raw, probit and 
treatment effects model estimates 
 Raw  probit  TE 
   β ME  β ME rho 
Males         
‘Active’ asset 23 -0.364  -0.104 -0.016  -0.641 -0.108 0.340 
   (0.066)   (0.075)  (0.070) 
‘Active’ asset 33 -0.324  -0.035 -0.005  -0.850 -0.166 0.493 
   (0.576)   (0.000)  (0.002) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 -0.324  -0.152 -0.022  -0.393  0.273 
   (0.039)   (0.097)  (0.306) 
£200<£1,000 -0.471  -0.203 -0.029  -0.671   
   (0.009)   (0.101)   
£1,000+ -0.487  -0.165 -0.024  -0.911   
   (0.044)   (0.178)   
Grouped 33         
0<£200 -0.227  -0.074 -0.011  -0.452  0.510 
   (0.404)   (0.000)  (0.002) 
£200<£1,000 -0.317  -0.041 -0.006  -0.649   
   (0.639)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ -0.448  -0.127 -0.019  -1.235   
   (0.110)   (0.000)   
         
Females         
‘Active’ asset 23 -0.365  -0.055 -0.012  -0.962 -0.225 0.646 
   (0.266)   (0.010)  (0.005) 
‘Active’ asset 33 -0.394  -0.085 -0.018  -1.219 -0.321 0.862 
   (0.103)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Grouped 23         
0<£200 -0.263  -0.065 -0.014  -0.468  0.421 
   (0.292)   (0.008)  (0.039) 
£200<£1,000 -0.415  -0.083 -0.017  -0.791   
   (0.214)   (0.010)   
£1,000+ -0.522  -0.112 -0.023  -1.264   
   (0.141)   (0.010)   
Grouped 33         
0<£200 -0.170  -0.072 -0.015  -0.456  0.499 
   (0.312)   (0.001)  (0.010) 
£200<£1,000 -0.416  -0.141 -0.028  -0.748   
   (0.052)   (0.000)   
£1,000+ -0.479  -0.130 -0.027  -1.214   
   (0.049)   (0.001)   
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis. Model estimates statistically significant at the 5% 
level shown in bold. Marginal effects (ME) are evaluated at sample means. Assets are valued 
in 1981 prices. ‘Active’ assets denote asset holdings above the minimum cut-offs defined in 
Section 3. 
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7. Conclusions 
There is a strong incentive for individuals to accumulate financial assets as they 
play a number of important functions in terms of financial well-being. Assets 
allow individuals to smooth income by drawing down on savings during times 
when income falls; which might be due to the loss of employment or when 
expenditure rises such as following the birth of a baby. Assets allow individuals 
to pay for large items of expenditure without turning to the credit market such 
as the purchase of a car, to fund training schemes and education, covering the 
cost of home improvements or to pay for a holiday. Savings can also provide a 
deposit for the purchase of a house or to cover the start-up costs of a business. 
Asset-holding provides individuals with a sense of security that during times of 
need they would have an asset to draw upon and this has a positive effect on 
emotional well-being.  
 
The benefits of saving and asset-holding for these purposes are obvious and 
have long been recognised. In more recent times claims have been made that 
there is a wider ‘asset-effect’ which leads to a positive impact on a range of 
outcomes. This means that asset-poor individuals are doubly disadvantaged. 
This has been used to support a range of policy initiatives that have collectively 
become known as ‘asset-based welfare’ which is seen by some as an expanded 
vision of poverty alleviation. These policies have primarily focused on 
addressing asset poverty through matched savings schemes and savings 
vehicles designed to encourage savings among those on a low income. The 
other main policy has focused on schemes that encourage parents to save on 
behalf of their children. Some of these schemes include contributions made by 
government (such was the case with the Child Trust Fund) and some have 
matched savings and all allow for tax-free savings (usually with a cap) on the 
behalf of children. Once children reach maturity they can access these accounts 
and start adult life with an asset. 
 
However, beyond simple correlations which suggest that individuals with 
assets have better outcomes compared with individuals without assets there is 
very little hard statistical evidence of an asset-effect. In this study we have tried 
to go further than previous research in identifying an asset-effect. We have 
used a very rich longitudinal data source, the National Child Development 
Study, which allows us to look at the asset position of individuals at one point 
in time and map these individuals to various outcomes in later life. As the 
individuals in this survey have been tracked since birth we are able to control 
for important differences between individuals in terms of their ability and 
desire to accumulate assets in the first place, characteristics which it is fair to 
assume are also related to the outcomes of interest, to try and isolate a pure 
asset-effect. We have used various statistical techniques to control for 
differences between individuals with and without assets as well as between 
individuals with higher and lower asset accumulations, particularly those 
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characteristics which could lead to a bias in any measured asset-effect. For 
example, individuals with more privileged family backgrounds may be more 
likely to have a financial asset and have improved outcomes. Without 
controlling for differences in family background it would appear that it is the 
asset that is leading to the improved outcome but this may not be the case. We 
go one step further than this through considering the possibility that 
individuals’ choice to accumulate an asset is influenced by what benefits they 
believe an asset would provide them with and these benefits may include the 
outcome variables we are interested in. In this sense individuals self-select and 
this selection provides a number of analytical problems when it comes to 
identifying an asset-effect, particularly where the presence of assets is 
endogenous. To make this more of a challenge, individuals most likely to 
benefit from asset-holding, in terms of our outcome variables, may be those 
who choose to accumulate financial assets. 
 
Four different outcomes have been assessed: wages, employment, general 
health and Malaise. We find evidence of a significant asset-effect in all four 
domains (although limited effects on general health and Malaise for men). We 
also find evidence that individuals self-select and that the decision to hold 
assets is endogenous in many cases. This leads to bias in simple OLS and 
probit estimates of the asset effect. However, there is some evidence that the 
identification required to estimate the causal effect of assets on these four 
outcomes is challenging and clearly more work can and should be done. 
However, bearing all of this in mind the conclusion is that assets have positive 
effects on wages, employment prospects, excellent general health and in 
reducing Malaise. These assets do not need to be large in size although higher 
assets are generally associated with improved outcomes. The evidence supports 
the basis for asset-based welfare policies, but it is not possible to assess 
whether improvements in these four domains could be more efficiently 
achieved through other policies or if the route through which an individual 
accumulates an asset is important. 
 
While we don’t yet have a complete table of marginal effects (treatment 
effects) for all outcomes and asset levels the final table (Table 18) summarises 
our preferred estimates of asset-effects across the four domains (wages, 
employment, general health, Malaise). These estimates are drawn from the 
treatments effects models where asset-holding was found to be endogenous or 
from the simple OLS/probit models where endogeneity was insignificant. 
 
The key findings are: 
 
 Asset holding at age 23 improves employment and wage prospects of 
women at age 33 and age 42. Assets do not need to be large to have a 
positive significant effect but higher value assets generally lead to better 
outcomes. Assets under £200 in 1981 (equivalent to £600 in 2010) put 
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women in a more favourable position compared to women with no savings 
or investments.  
 There is some evidence for this cohort of women that higher value assets at 
age 23 were associated with a decision not to work at age 33. 
 Asset holding at age 33 for women also lead to statistically significant 
improvements in wages and employment at age 42. 
 For men, assets held above the minimum defined thresholds at age 23 led to 
positive wage effects at age 33 and age 42. For men assets needed to be as 
high as £1,000 in 1981 (£3,000 in 2010) to have a statistically significant 
effects on wages. 
 Assets improve the employment prospects for men at age 33 and age 42. 
The asset effects appear stronger at age 33 than age 42 for assets held at age 
23 but assets held at age 33 have strong positive effects on employment 
probabilities at age 42. 
 We find significant asset effects on self-reported general health and Malaise 
at age 33 (for assets held at age 23) and age 42 (for assets held at age 23 and 
age 33) for women. Assets increase the probabilities of women reporting 
excellent general health and decrease the probability of Malaise. There is 
evidence that assets needed to be greater than £200 in 1981 (£600 in 2010) 
for the asset to have an effect on women’s health outcomes. 
 For men, asset holding (greater than £1,000 in 1981; £3,000 in 2010) at age 
23 increases the probability of reporting excellent general health at age 33 
and age 42, and age 33 assets on age 42 general health. However, lower 
levels of assets have the effect of reducing Malaise probabilities at age 33 
and age 42. It appears overall that the effect of assets on general health and 
Malaise is stronger for women than for men. 
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Table 18: Estimated asset-effects – preferred estimates 
 
Employment outcomes Health outcomes 
 
Wages/33 Wages/42 Emp/33 Emp/42 GH/33 GH/42 Mal/33 Mal/42 
MEN 
        Age 23 assets 
        Active asset 4.2% 3.2% 27.1% 13.8% NS(2.4%) NS(3.7%) -1.4% NS(-10.8%) 
         0<£200 NS NS NS 2.5% NS NS NS -2.2% 
£200<£1000 NS(3.0%) NS 4.7%** 3.3% NS NS -1.5% -2.9% 
£1000+ 6.6% NS(5.4%) 5.7%** 3.7% NS(3.7%) NS(5.7%) -1.6% -2.4% 
         Age 33 assets 
        Active asset N/A 7.8% N/A 30.6% N/A NS(4.1%) N/A -16.6% 
         0<£200 N/A -ve N/A +ve N/A NS N/A -ve 
£200<£1000 N/A NS N/A 4.2%** N/A NS N/A -ve 
£1000+ N/A 15.6%* N/A 3.5%** N/A 6.0% N/A -ve 
         WOMEN 
        Age 23 assets 
        Active asset 5.2% -1.2% NS 37.1% 26.8% 19.7% -23.1% -22.5% 
         0<£200 5.7%* 6.8% 5.7% 4.3%** +ve +ve -ve -ve 
£200<£1000 10.4%* 7.4% 5.0% 5.1%** 4.1%** 5.3%** -ve -ve 
£1000+ 11.0%* NS(4.6%) NS 5.6%** 10.3%** 5.9%** -2.1%** -ve 
         Age 33 assets 
        Active asset N/A 7.6% N/A 48.9% N/A 33.2% N/A -32.1% 
         0<£200 N/A NS N/A 4.1%** N/A +ve N/A -ve 
£200<£1000 N/A 11.7%* N/A 7.0%** N/A 5.0%** N/A -2.8%** 
£1000+ N/A 12.6%* N/A +ve N/A 6.4%** N/A -2.7%** 
Notes: N/A not applicable. NS not statistically significant at the 5% level. Percentages shown 
in parenthesis are significant at the 10% level.  
** indicates estimates from the simple OLS/probit models where marginal effects are not 
available from the treatment effects models which we believe under-estimate the true asset-
effect. 
* indicates estimates from the simple OLS/probit models where marginal effects are not 
available from the treatment effects models which we believe over-estimate the true asset-
effect. 
+ve/-ve are used to denote positive/negative statistically significant effects where marginal 
effects are not available. 
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Appendix A: Description of the data 
 
    Total  Male  Female 
 Survey Information No. (%) (%) 
Respondents  1981 Survey 12,537 50.0 50.0 
 1991 Survey 11,405 49.2 50.8 
  2000 Survey 11,417 49.3 50.7 
Attrition In 1974 & not in 1991 3,401 31.4 24.6 
  In 1974 & not in 2000 3,417 31.5 24.9 
Missing 
assets 
In 1991 missing 1981 
assets* 
1,660 15.8 13.3 
 In 2000 missing 1981 
assets* 
1,786 17.1 14.2 
23 yrs old Demographic Profile  (%) (%) (%) 
Ethnicity White 75.8 73.3 78.4 
(1981) Non-White 1.5 1.6 1.4 
 Missing 22.7 25.1 20.2 
Ethnicity White 97 96.8 97.2 
(1991) Non-White 2.2 2.3 2.1 
 Missing 0.8 0.9 0.7 
Social 
Background 
(Father’s 
Social class 
in 1958) 
Professional 4.1 4.2 4.1 
Intermediate 12.1 12.1 12.1 
Skilled Non-Manual 9.2 9.4 9.0 
Skilled Manual 45.6 45.0 46.1 
Semi-skilled 11.1 10.9 11.3 
Unskilled  8.2 8.5 7.9 
Missing 9.8 9.9 9.6 
Education None, CSE 2-5 37.5 41.2 33.8 
 O Levels 35.3 33.2 37.5 
 A Levels 12.1 11.1 13.0 
 Further Education 5.1 3.7 6.5 
 Higher Education 9.9 10.6 9.1 
 Missing 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Marital 
Status 
Single 51.7 62.8 40.6 
Married 44.6 34.8 54.4 
Separated 2.2 1.6 2.7 
 Divorced 1.4 0.7 2.1 
 Widowed 0.1 0.0 0.2 
  Missing 0.0 0.1 0.0 
No of  0 75.4 83.4 67.4 
Dependent 1 15.5 11.4 19.5 
Children  2+ 9.2 5.2 13.1 
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33 yrs old Demographic Profile (%) (%) (%) 
Region North 5.2 5.1 5.2 
 North West 11.2 11 11.5 
 Yorks. & Humberside 10.4 10.5 10.4 
 West Midlands 9.4 9.9 9.0 
 East Midlands 6.2 6.8 5.6 
 East Anglia 3.9 3.7 4.2 
 South West 8.9 8.7 9.1 
 South East 24.1 24.0 24.2 
 London 7.2 7.2 7.2 
 Wales 5.0 5.1 4.8 
 Scotland 8.5 8.1 8.9 
Marital 
Status 
Single 17.3 20.5 14.2 
Married 6.08 66.0 70.0 
Separated 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Divorced 8.1 6.5 9.8 
Widowed 0.2 0.1 0.4 
Missing 3.6 4.3 3 
Education None, CSE 2-5 40.6 43.9 37.5 
 O Levels 29.0 26.6 31.3 
 A Levels 10.4 9.4 11.3 
 Further Education 9.1 8.2 9.9 
 Higher Education 10.9 12.0 9.9 
  Missing 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Social Class  Professional 3.4 4.8 2.0 
 Intermediate 12.6 11.3 13.9 
 Skilled Non-Manual 31.8 15.9 47.2 
 Skilled Manual 13.9 21.9 6.2 
 Semi-skilled 21.7 26.4 17.3 
 Unskilled  4.7 6.7 2.8 
  Missing 11.9 13.0 10.8 
* This is the share of individuals for whom we have information on their outcomes but 
information on their assets is missing in the base year. 
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Appendix B: Treatment effects models 
 
1. Binary treatment, continuous outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
where the errors have a bivariate normal distribution (u, ε) ~ N2[0, 0, 1, ζ, ρ] 
 
Assuming that: 
 
 
 
which in this case the likelihood function equals: 
 
 
 
and the standardized Prob  
 
where:  and  
 
Based on the treatment effects model, the log likelihood function is defined for 
observation i, where the latent variable is a binary probit: 
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2. Ordered treatment (3 levels), continuous outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
where the errors have a bivariate normal distribution (u, ε) ~ N2[0, 0, 1, ζ, ρ] 
 
In the case where z is ordinal and modelled via an ordered probit (for example 
with three values): 
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3. Binary treatment, binary outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
where the errors have a bivariate normal distribution (u, ε) ~ N2[0, 0, 1, 1, ρ] 
 
let  
 
   zi=0 
 
   zi=1 
 
4. Ordered treatment (3 levels), binary outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
where the errors have a bivariate normal distribution (u, ε) ~ N2[0, 0, 1, 1, ρ] 
 
In the case where z is ordinal and modelled via an ordered probit (for example 
with three values): 
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Appendix C: Malaise Inventory 
 
‘These questions are concerned with how you are feeling generally. Please 
answer them by ticking either the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ box for each on. It is important 
that you try to answer ALL the questions.’ 
 
1. Do you often have back-ache? 
2. Do you feel tired most of the time? 
3. Do you often feel miserable or depressed? 
4. Do you often have bad head-aches? 
5. Do you often get worried about things? 
6. Do you usually have great difficulty in falling asleep? 
7. Do you usually wake unnecessarily early in the morning? 
8. Do you wear yourself out worrying about your health? 
9. Do you often get into a violent rage? 
10. Do people often annoy and irritate you? 
11. Have you at times had a twitching of the face, head or shoulders? 
12. Do you often suddenly become scared for no good reason? 
13. Are you scared to be alone when there are not friends near you? 
14. Are you easily upset or irritated? 
15. Are you frightened of going out alone or of meeting people? 
16. Are you constantly keyed up and jittery? 
17. Do you suffer from indigestion? 
18. Do you suffer from an upset stomach? 
19. Is your appetite poor? 
20. Does every little thing get on your nerves and wear you out? 
21. Does your heart often race like mad? 
22. Do you often have bad pains in your eyes? 
23. Are you troubled with rheumatism or fibrosis? 
24. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? 
 
